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The very question of whether the Trump administration will be able to achieve peace in Ukraine is premature. At this moment, it is only possible to hope for a ceasefire. If a ceasefire is sustained for a certain period, actual peace negotiations – as opposed to formal but substance-empty meetings – can continue. It will be possible to hope for peace if time in a ceasefire is not used by the belligerents mainly for the recovery of their respective militaries.

But the odds are that even a ceasefire is a bridge too far.

No Conditions for Ceasefire

The reason is simple. Moscow is not ready for any compromises. It plays for victory, not a draw.

Success can be achieved on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, but it must be unquestionable. In Putin’s view, Ukraine needs to be defeated, and the West has to admit Ukraine’s – and its own – defeat publicly.

True, Russia’s resources to continue the war are not limitless, but they are far from exhausted. To date, there has been no shortage of men or money. Russian troops are advancing, casualties notwithstanding. The military industry runs at full speed. Russia’s partners like North Korea, Iran, and, above all, China, provide Moscow with material or diplomatic support. So, if the option of Ukrainian and Western surrender is not available yet, the Kremlin, in its own calculus, can wait.

Russia’s goals extend far beyond the question of territories, although this, too, is not a minor issue. From a legal standpoint, Russian negotiators will find it difficult to discuss the fate of territories that have been formally annexed by Russia and made part of the Russian constitution. Even if they have not yet been conquered, “ceding” them back to Ukraine, which freezing the conflict along the frontline would imply, might, in principle, amount to high treason charges for negotiators and would provoke protest among Russia’s fairly influential pro-war community.

NATO’s Role in a Potential Peace

Other requests will be lifting the Western economic sanctions, returning Russia’s seized assets, making a legally-binding agreement to keep Ukraine outside NATO, and reducing the size of the Ukrainian military to the level which will make it incapable of self-defence. Regarding the question of security guarantees, Russia will insist that no NATO country’s troops should be engaged in the mission – with the possible exception of Russia-friendly Slovakia and Hungary, but these countries, first, do not have the capacity and, second, will not be enthusiastic about being involved in such a manner.

The only demand in Moscow’s favor is that a certain number of the Western capitals see as acceptable is preventing Ukraine’s NATO entry. Most importantly, Donald Trump said he understands Vladimir Putin’s concerns. What other trade-offs could be is absolutely unclear.

Even the Russia-controlled Ukrainian territories are very unlikely to be recognized as Russia’s by a treaty.

Enter President-Elect Trump

Incentives for the Kremlin to soften its position are absent. There will be no chemistry between Trump and Putin. If, in 2016, members of the Russian parliament were uncorking champagne to celebrate Trump’s victory, in 2024, it took Putin a day and a half before he squeezed out of himself words of congratulation. Moscow remembers too well many actions of the first Trump administration that could hardly gain Russia’s approval, the most important of which in Ukraine’s context was lifting a taboo on deliveries of lethal weapons to Kyiv and providing it with “Javelin” anti-tank systems. In other words, Putin does not owe anything to Trump.

Verbal pressure on Putin from the White House will not bear fruit. The Russian leadership has accumulated much experience living with the Western economic sanctions. The sanctions would have to tighten much more to become unacceptably painful for Russia, but that would come at a substantial economic cost for the West, including the US. Apparently, this is not viewed as plausible by Moscow.

Meanwhile, positive incentives are not obvious either. Every U.S. president from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump tried to improve or reset US-Russian relations. And every time at the end of a presidential term the relationship was worse than at the beginning. Structural reasons for that are many and cannot be explained in brief, but the point is that a promise of yet another “normalization” will not be seen in Moscow as a credible proposition.

What Happens Next? 

Does this mean that the West can abandon Ukraine without a negotiated solution? The probability is, unfortunately, not zero, but the consequences for the West will be dramatic. Left to its own devices and militarily defeated, Ukraine would either destabilize and disintegrate, continue to depopulate and lose chances for economic recovery, or have its eastern borders defined by Moscow with an installed marionette government administering some territory in the center. Worse, in this situation, Belarus and Moldova, partially or fully, are likely to be annexed by Russia, which will significantly aggravate the security situation.

ATACMS missiles like used in Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Achieving peace in Ukraine will be a long-term effort. The best Western leaders can do in this situation is to leave behind the illusion that a quick fix is possible and the explicable but counterproductive fatigue. Only Western re-affirmed commitment to the cause can gradually alter the Kremlin’s calculus. 

About the Author: Arkady Moshes 

Arkady Moshes serves as Program Director, Research Program on Russia, EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia, at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki.