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While NATO has largely maintained its unity against Moscow following Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, the alliance’s political pronouncements of support have not been met with similar resolve when it comes to the appetite for risk-taking, with the absence of a workable strategy for victory in Ukraine and a focus on escalation management hampering Western efforts to defeat the invasion. 

Equally concerning has been the relatively slow pace of rearmament and modernization among the allies themselves, with rhetoric again not matching the money that needs to be spent to overhaul the alliance’s military machinery.  Almost three years since the Russian invasion, only 23 of the 32 NATO allies have met or promised to meet the minimum 2% of GDP to be spent on defense. It took a decade of US pressure, cajoling, and finally the growing threat posed by Russia for the European allies to reach this level, for in 2014 only three allies met the 2% minimum threshold.  The estimated total investment in defense for the European NATO allies in 2024 stands at $430 billion, roughly half of what the United States will have spent this year.

And while the allies have earned plaudits for this accomplishment, it is worth noting that Russia currently spends over 6% of its GDP on defense this year, with a planned 25% increase in 2025—a new post-Soviet high.   

NATO: Matching Arms and Goals 

The key issue facing NATO today is the lack of exercised, conventional military capabilities to resource the new regional plans properly. 

On paper, European NATO allies may be able to field between 100,000—200,000 troops, but even these numbers fall short of what is needed. Given that the United States’ active duty military stands at 1.3 million (in reality, probably less considering recruitment and retention shortfalls), of which the Army constitutes 443,000, and considering the fact that threats are rising in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, the burden of providing conventional capabilities for the European theater must fall on the European allies, with the United States providing its current conventional component, high-end enablers, C2 integration, and most of all the nuclear umbrella. 

To put it differently, the path for NATO to retain its viability and effectiveness going forward will rest not on the perennial debates about percentages of GDP spent on defense or “burden-sharing,” but in effect on “burden-transferring” to allow the United States to maintain its commitment to European security and defense at an acceptable cost that also frees its military to focus its limited resources on the Pacific theater.  

NATO, Russia and Politics

The fundamental challenge facing NATO is the question of political commitment. Europe is a wealthy continent, with vast economic and population resources—the population of the European Union member-states alone is close to 450 million. It is simply unacceptable that allies as wealthy as these continue to struggle to provide the requisite forces to deter and, should Putin decide to breach the NATO fence, resoundingly defeat the Russian Federation. 

NATO M270 MLRS. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Today’s Russia is a pale shadow of the former imperial Soviet Union, with roughly half of the former USSR’s population, none of the East European satellite military power it once commanded, nor with its geopolitical advantage of controlling Eastern Germany.  And while countries along the Northeast Corridor, especially Sweden, Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland, are arming at speed and scale, with Poland already spending 4% of GDP on defense and planning to reach 5% in 2025, the alliance as a whole continues to flounder when it comes to meeting its defense requirements.   

At the Vilnius summit in 2023 all NATO governments signed on to the regional plans, including the capabilities requirements mandated by them.  Not providing those military forces is in effect tantamount to reneging on their treaty obligations as NATO members.  And while throughout the post-Cold War decades many countries were able to continue to avoid investing in defense – notwithstanding America’s pressure to do so – the arrival of the Trump administration marks the end of business as usual.  How the European allies respond to this challenge, i.e., whether they get serious about rearmament or continue to dither, will define NATO’s future.  

The ahead path for NATO is straightforward—it will hinge on transferring the burden from the US to the European allies regarding conventional capabilities.  It is time for the allies to assume the core responsibility for generating these forces. 

Suppose Europe signals its determination to move forward to rearm to meet NATO planning and capabilities requirements. In that case, the United States will doubtless assist in this effort, for the alliance secures the Atlantic theater and remains a force multiplier for the United States. 

NATO

Maj. Barak Amundson and 1st Lt. Matthew Scott, 493rd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron pilots, fly over Lithuania during a training mission with the Lithuanian air force April 23, 2014. The 48th Air Expeditionary Group has been conducting the Baltic Air Policing mission here since January and will be handing over the mission to the Polish air force at the beginning of May. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Dana J. Butler/Released)

Let’s hope Europe heeds the call and rises to the occasion.  

About the Author: Andrew A. Michta 

Andrew A. Michta is a Senior Fellow and Director of the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own.