China’s Military Power: The Capability Forest Beyond Corruption Trees

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This week, the Department of Defense released its twenty-fourth annual China Military Power Report (CMPR). Here are the most important revelations from its 182 pages that informed professionals need to know.

China’s Military Might, Explained 

China’s armed forces are massive, well-funded, and modernizing rapidly. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the world’s largest military force, with 2.035 million active, 510,000 reserve, and 500,000 paramilitary personnel. It is funded by the world’s second largest defense budget, which the Pentagon estimates at $330-450 billion in actuality, and further supported by the world’s fourth greatest arms sales. Two things are true at once: China’s military remains riddled with corruption, but is nevertheless engaged under Xi in the most dramatic military buildup seen since World War II. If Xi and his Party Army were as discombobulated as some preoccupied with the latest PLA “palace intrigue” imagine, there’s no way they could be building, deploying, exercising, and preparing the way they clearly are. The report documents numerous elements of that tremendous progress, allowing readers to see for themselves the lush capabilities rainforest flourishing feverishly despite widespread putrefaction and some rotten corruption trees.

Nuclear Buildup

Of all the potent progress the CMPR catalogues, perhaps nothing is more concerning than the dramatic expansion and diversification of China’s nuclear arsenal. The report’s data are generally current as of “early 2024,” by which time China already had over 600 operational nuclear warheads, a great increase from the over 500 it tallied last year. All of China’s roughly 400 ICBMs can reach the continental United States (CONUS).

The Pentagon projects over 1,000 operational PRC warheads by 2030, most fielded on systems capable of ranging CONUS, and many deployed at higher readiness levels. Stockpile growth will continue through 2035, which the 2023 CMPR projected “in line with previous estimates” and by which time the 2022 CMPR anticipated 1,500 warheads.Additional advanced nuclear delivery systems likely under development include strategic Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) and Fractional Orbital Bombardment systems, the latter at least partially demonstrated in a July 2021 test. These frontier efforts draw on potent dynamics: “The PRC has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and has dramatically advanced its development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past 20 years.”

As the CMPR explains, Beijing’s nuclear buildup reflects determination to have usable military options on every rung of the escalation ladder. The urgency to do so is amplified by the perception that China faces military competition, crisis, and possibly even conflict with the United States—the last most likely regarding Taiwan. Accordingly, PRC planners seek to deter American and allied intervention in a Taiwan-related scenario if possible and escalation if necessary: “The PLA’s expanding nuclear force will enable it to target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites than ever before in a potential nuclear conflict.” That overriding priority is the only sufficient explanation from the dramatic departure under Xi from previous relative numerical restraint in nuclear weapons.

To rapidly build additional nuclear warheads, China needs copious plutonium. Among significant elements of their deadly serious strategic partnership, Russia is literally fueling China’s nuclear weapons production in support of its new nuclear materials production and reprocessing facilities. Russia has provided highly-enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel assemblies to China’s two fast breeder reactors at Xiapu, the first of which is already completed. In one of countless fabrications the CMPR documents, “PRC officials claim the CFR-600 reactors are intended to help the PRC achieve its civilian nuclear power and carbon neutrality objectives.” In actuality, “the quantity of HEU transferred from Russia to the PRC for its CFR-600 nuclear reactors is more than the entire amount removed worldwide under U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices in the last three decades.”

Potent Rocket Force

The vast majority of China’s nuclear weapons are ground-launchable by the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). Three new silo fields add 320 silos for solid-propellant ICBMs. China is also in the process of more than doubling its DF-5 liquid-propellant ICBM force to likely 50 silos. As part of an effort to upgrade older ICBM families, including with MIRVs, at least 30 new silos will hold the DF-5C. Burgeoning new-generation ICBM families include DF-31s and -41s. The Pentagon also anticipates possible silo and rail deployment of DF-41 road mobile ICBMs, which have up to three warheads each.

Already, the PLARF keeps part of its nuclear forces on “combat readiness duty” and “high alert duty”—heightened peacetime preparations. New silo-based ICBMs, at least three early warning satellites, and Russian ballistic missile early warning assistance portend movement toward “early warning counterstrike” posture—what the United States terms launch on warning (LOW). In September 2023, China test-launched two CSS-10 Mod 3 ICBMs from training silos in Western China: “The PRC probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its force, especially its new silo-based units, on a LOW posture.”

Beijing’s “counter-intervention” strategy and multi-domain precision warfare operations additionally emphasize all manner of missiles that can deliver a full range of conventional payloads to all conceivable targets. For example, China simulated “Joint Firepower Strike Operations” against Taiwan, in part by live-firing PLA Army-controlled PCH191 close-range ballistic missiles in its 2022 exercises, and drilling with the missile in its 2023 exercises. This precision missile system would play a critical role in joint fires during a Taiwan campaign.

China has also developed no fewer than five types of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), the majority under PLARF control. China’s first ASBM, the DF-21D, is capable of rapid reloading in the field. The DF-26 ASBM variant can rapidly be swapped out for conventional and nuclear land-attack alternatives. Notably, the DF-26 is capable of nuclear precision strikes, potentially with low-yield optionality. In addition to conventional anti-ship and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads, the numerous DF-17 has a HGV mode to evade U.S. and allied radar and ballistic missile defense.

While the 5,000-8,000 km-range DF-27 IRBM/ICBM has been mentioned briefly in the previous three CMPRs, this year’s report confirms its deployment and devotes unprecedented coverage. In addition to its conventional anti-ship mode, it can carry HGV and conventional and nuclear land-attack payloads. Potential targets include Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii.

Finally, in a concerning portent, the CMPR projects that China “may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems” to threaten “targets in CONUS, Hawaii, and Alaska.”

China’s Surging Sea Services

China’s major military exercises against Taiwan have also showcased significant maritime force readiness and surge capacity. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is increasing interoperability, integration, and coordination; in increasing scale and sophistication, with its sister sea services: the Coast Guard and Maritime Militia—the latter of which operate on the frontlines of PRC maritime disputes, and under the command of the Theater Command within which they operate (e.g., Eastern Theater Command or Southern Theater Command).

China’s Coast Guard, the world’s largest numerically, has more than 150 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (over 1,000 tons), more than 50 regional patrol combatants (over 500 tons), 300 coastal patrol craft (100-499 tons). While overall ship numbers are unavailable for China’s Maritime Militia, it is the world’s largest and most capable such force, and the CMPR details how it “is very active.” In 2023, an average of 195 Maritime Militia vessels were detected per day in the South China Sea, an increase of roughly 35%. A notable example of their operations was the “constant presence” of Maritime Militia vessels near Iroquois Reef, within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), from September 2021 to September 2022.

China’s navy, the world’s largest in number of hulls, already has over 370 ships and submarines (including more than 140 major surface combatants)—not counting the 22 Type 056 Jiangdao corvettes it transferred to the Coast Guard or the ~60 Type 022 Houbei missile catamarans it retains. The Pentagon forecasts 395 PLAN battle force ships by 2025, including 65 submarines; and 435 by 2030, including 80 submarines.

As the second leg of China’s nuclear triad, Jin-class Type 094 SSBNs conduct near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols. They can deploy the JL-3 SLBM, whose range enables targeting CONUS from bastions in the South China Sea or Bohai Gulf. Type 094 production continues beyond the six SSBNs already deployed, even though the improved Type 096 with a MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missile is slated to begin production in the mid-2020s. The Pentagon allows for the possibility of 096 delays for the 094’s continued production, while alternatively positing “an effort to accelerate [China’s] sea-based nuclear capability as Xi has directed.” Given Xi’s rush to prepare for possible war over Taiwan on his watch, I find the latter explanation persuasive.

This year’s CMPR is only the second edition to mention the YJ-21 hypersonic weapon; and the first to specify that is an ASBM, which has been test-fired from a Type 055 Renhai cruiser. China’s eight massive Type 055s merit special emphasis, with their advanced sensor and communications technology, as well as 112 vertical launch tubes that can hold manifold missiles: land-attack, anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine. Type 055s and other major warships also have a key role as escorts for China’s emerging carrier force, a growing focus and organizing principle within the PLAN.

As part of China’s growing power projection capabilities, four Type 093B Shang III guided-missile nuclear attack submarines, three of which may be operational by 2025, may have land-attack cruise missiles—a trend likely to spread to major warships. The rapidly developing PLAN Marine Corps is preparing for expeditionary missions to uphold PRC overseas interests regionally; and increasingly globally, with 400 personnel stationed in Djibouti.

Air Force Acquisitions of China

China’s Air Force has likewise been active in China’s military exercises and All-Domain Pressure Campaign against Taiwan, with frequent crossings of the Taiwan Strait centerline and operations within Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft are rapidly approaching American technology standards, and finally powered by workable indigenous engines.

In 2023 the PLAAF achieved an inter-service advancement that its rival in overwater aviation surely fought. It acquired a profusion of assets previously under the PLAN’s control: shore-based fixed-wing combat aviation units, radar and air defense units, and related facilities that had long belonged to its navy. This includes 300 fighter aircraft (e.g., all JH-7 maritime strike fighter-bombers) as well as all H-6J maritime strike bombers. For power projection, China’s air force now has 51 Y-20A heavy lift transports, whose up to 2,400 nautical mile range may be extended by 16 Y-20U tankers.

China’s Air Force manages a third, already developing leg of China’s nuclear triad. The H-6N bomber can carry an air-launched ballistic missile, while a H-20 flying wing stealth strategic bomber with over 10,000 km range is under development.

Conclusion: Don’t Miss the Forest for the Trees

So much depends on how a problem is framed. Analysts of China’s military should not miss the forest for the trees. If Xi and the PLA were in the disarray that some myopically focused on their system’s chronic corruption imagine, there’s no way China’s military could be developing, deploying, exercising, and otherwise preparing in the ways that the CMPR chronicles. Instead, Beijing is clearly continuing the most dramatic military buildup since World War II. That’s the overwhelming reality we ignore at our peril. The proof is in the pudding, and the Pentagon just served up the biggest public dessert of the year.

How best to prepare these great and growing military forces to “fight and win” against the most capable of opponents is an area of complex challenges but unremitting effort. China is additionally developing significant enabling capabilities in the space, electromagnetic, and cyber domains. How best to support and organize them is a continuing area of focus for Xi. Having created the Strategic Support Force as part of his sweeping military reforms in 2015-16, Xi disestablished it on 19 April 2024. He has reassigned its subordinate forces, the Aerospace Force and the Cyberspace Force, directly under the Central Military Commission. To these, he has added a new arm: the Information Support Force.

This is one of many important examples of Xi’s unstinting determination to meet the requirements of his Centennial Military Building Goal of 2027—his capabilities development deadline for his armed forces to offer, in important part, a full battery of military operational capabilities against Taiwan. Xi’s extreme ambitions face commensurate difficulties, and the United States—together with Allies, partners, and friends—still have options to bolster defenses and deter aggression. But margins are growing thin, and time is running out. 

About the Author: Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is Professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). A core founding member, he helped establish CMSI and stand it up officially in 2006, and has played an integral role in its development; from 2021–23 he served as Research Director. Erickson is currently a Visiting Scholar in full-time residence at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, where he has been an Associate in Research since 2008. He has received the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal, NWC’s inaugural Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award, and NBR’s inaugural Ellis Joffe Prize for PLA Studies. He blogs at www.andrewerickson.com.