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Key Points: Israel launched Operation Bashan Arrow, a comprehensive military campaign targeting Syria’s remaining military assets amid the collapse of Syria’s regular armed forces.

-The Israeli Air Force deployed 350 aircraft to strike air defense systems, missile launchers, and critical facilities, while the Navy targeted Syrian naval assets using advanced remotely piloted munitions, likely including navalized Spike missiles or kamikaze drones.

-Notably, Israeli forces sank five Osa-II missile boats and destroyed several coastal defense systems.

-The operation underscores Israel’s determination to neutralize Syrian threats and its broader strategy of military dominance, drawing parallels to its historical success in the 1973 Battle of Latakia.

Operation Bashan Arrow: Israel Decimates Syrian Navy in Bold Strike

Israel took advantage of the effective evaporation of Syria’s regular armed forces before a rebel offensive to launch a massive strike campaign called Operation Bashan Arrow aimed at destroying 320 of the most valuable remaining military assets and supporting military-industrial facilities of its oldest enduring military adversary 

While 350 Israeli combat aircraft conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian warplanes, helicopters, missile launchers, air defense systems, tanks, ammunitions depots, chemical weapons stores, and munition factories, on December 9 Israel’s Navy also launched a naval sortie likely involving its Haifa-based Sa’ar 4.5 missile boats (and/or larger Sa’ar-5 and Sa’ar-6 missile corvettes) targeting Syrian Navy boats berthed at the Mediterranean ports of Latakia, and Minet el-Beida, and nearby coastal-defense missile batteries.

Subsequent camera footage (see above) from Latakia shows the remains of one damaged and five sunk Osa-II missile boats identifiable by their ribbed cylindrical missile-launch canisters.

Some sources also allege damage to Syria’s remaining Petya-III-class anti-submarine frigate, decommissioned back in 2018, though the visual evidence is less definitive.

Israeli footage of the attacks suggests the employment of remotely piloted munitions—likely navalized Spike anti-tank missiles or Green Dragon kamikaze drones—to strike moored missile boats precisely. 

That doesn’t rule out beefier radar-guided Harpoon or Gabriel anti-ship missiles with much larger warheads weren’t also employed.

Syria’s Navy doesn’t appear destroyed, however. 

The small service reportedly possessed as many as 16 Osa-Is and -IIs, and satellite photos on Dec. 11 show six more intact Osas at Tartus port, perhaps spared due to being near Russian navy piers. 

Naval analyst H.I. Sutton estimates, however, that five out of six of the Syrian Navy’s tiny 26-ton Tir-II missile boats were most likely destroyed by the Israeli attack at Minet-el-Beida, as well as three additional Osas at Latakia (ie. 9 total).

Also unclear are the status of the service’s three Polnoncny B-class medium amphibious landing ships and myriad smaller minesweepers (7), patrol boats (16), and auxiliaries. 

Of course, how many of these vessels remain in (or are restorable to) operational condition is unclear.

Arguably more critical are Syria’s land-based coastal defense missiles, mainly two Bastion batteries armed with 72 supersonic Yakhont anti-ship missiles reportedly purchased from Russia in 2011. Theoretically, these would have posed a significant threat to the Israeli naval raid had their mobile missile launchers and supporting radar systems remained operational.

While Israel did strike coastal anti-ship missile batteries, it’s not yet confirmed whether these include Bastions (as some allege); it might also refer to older Syrian P-5, P-1,5 and YJ-83 coastal defense batteries.  It’s also possible Western intelligence agencies are hoping to smuggle Bastion components out of the country for analysis.

The massive strike campaign targeting Syria’s currently undefended military assets, combined with an Israeli ground incursion of “indefinite” duration into Syrian territory, suggests little optimism or concern for a less hostile relationship with whatever new government takes power in Damascus.

Meanwhile, the most critical question facing Syria’s naval capabilities revolves around the fate of the Russian military bases in Tartus and Latakia, as Moscow currently seeks to win the favor of the very rebels it tried its utmost to annihilate with years of infamously indiscriminate aerial bombing.  

The Battle of Latakia

Israel’s 2024 strikes are the second time Syria’s missile boats were devastated by Israeli warships following the Battle of Latakia, 51 years earlier.

Syria’s Navy was founded in 1950, initially using boats donated by personnel trained in France, operating primarily from Latakia and Tartus with secondary bases at Baniyas and Minet-el Beida. 

However, its combat power increased sharply with the acquisition of Soviet missile boats in the 1960s.

The development of ship-launched anti-ship missiles had abruptly made it possible for small, short-ranged patrol boats to threaten big warships from a distance. In 1959 the Soviet Union developed the first fast attack missile boat, the Project 183R Komar-class, which displaced just 66 tons yet carried two nearly three-ton P-15 Termit missiles measuring 5.8 meters long that could cripple a big warship from 25 miles away. 

Concluding the Komars were perhaps too minimalist, and the Soviets followed up with the more significant, more sea-worthy Project 205 Moskit (“Mosquito”) missile boat, codenamed Osa by NATO, with double the missile payload and a greatly improved MR-331 radar. A shipyard in Vladivostok churned out over 400 Osas through 1973 which were widely exported.

Such inexpensive short-range boats perfectly suited Syria, and they were primarily geared to fight neighboring Israel. Indeed, Egypt’s Navy executed the first successful ship-to-ship missile attack with the sinking of the gun-armed Israeli destroyer Eilat in October 21, 1967. 

But by then, Israel was already procuring a dozen fast attack boats from a French shipyard in Cherbourg. While the first six Sa’ar-class vessels had guns only, the second six  Sa’ar-3s were fitted to launch Israeli-designed Gabriel Mk 1 missiles. A French embargo in 1967, half-way through construction, failed to prevent Israel from smuggling out the remaining boats in via special operation on Christmas Eve 1969 under the pretext of resale to Norwegian middlemen.

Displacing 250 tons fully loaded, the diesel-engine Sa’ar-3s required just 40 crew, could accelerate up to 46 miles per hour, and carry six Gabriel missiles in addition to their 76-millimeter deck guns. 

For several years, Israel’s untested missile boat fleet relentlessly trained for an unprecedented new ‘technical’ form of naval warfare under commander Michael Barkai.

On October 6, 1973, Syria launched a massive armored assault on the Golan Heights in the Yom Kippur War in concert with an Egyptian attack. That same evening, Markai dispatched five boats from Haifa to raid Latakia 190 miles to the north. Their mission: to draw out and destroy Syria’s missile boat fleet. At that time, Israel disposed of 14 Sa’ar boats (some still retaining only gun armament) while Syria counted six Komar and three Osa missile boats supported by a dozen torpedo boats.

The Israeli force divided into parallel columns, one including the Sa’ar-3sGa’ash and Hanit and the Sa’ar-2 Mezanek (a Sa’ar-1 upgraded to carry missiles), the other with the missile-less Sa’ar-1 Mivtah and the first indigenously-built Sa’ar-4, INS Reshef. Displacing 450 tons, Reshef was 20% slower than her predecessors but boasted expanded missile payload, more extended patrol range, and the task force’s only computerized fire control system.

While approaching Latakia at 10:30 pm, Reshef stumbled upon and promptly crippled a Syrian K-123-series torpedo boat using radar-directed gunfire at a 5.5-mile range; its commander nonetheless managed to radio wa arning of the approaching Israeli force. Then they encountered the hapless 580-ton T43-class minesweeper Yarmouk, disabling her with two missiles as she fled northward (a third missed). 

Finally, at 11:30, the Israeli force encountered its more dangerous intended target: two Syrian Komar and one Osa missile boat issuing from Latakia–resulting in the first-ever naval battle between ships both equipped with anti-ship missiles. 

The Israeli boats seemingly were about to take a beating as their smaller half-ton Gabriel-I missiles had half the maximum range (12 miles) of the Syrian P-15 missiles. As radar warning receivers warned the Israeli boats, they were being painted by Syrian radars, the Israeli boats fell back as the Syrian boats released numerous Termit missiles at near maximum range.

But it turned out that the Israeli Navy was gambling on a novel electronic countermeasure system developed by one Capt. Herut Tsemach to promptly ID the frequency used by Termit guidance radars missiles and jam them. Furthermore, overflying Israeli helicopters and clouds of chaff released by ship-launched ‘Avshalom’ and ‘Amnon’ rockets lured Syrian missiles away from their targets. 

These untested methods paid off: not one Syrian missile hit. Tsemach, monitoring the battle from the base, reportedly spun around his chair in glee. The false radar contacts produced by decoys had convinced the Syrians they were under massive attack, compelling the expenditure of most missiles. The disappearance of decoy blips then convinced the Syrian commander he had sunk five Israeli vessels.

The undamaged Israeli boat then turned around and charged the Syrian boats at flank speed. The two Komars had no missiles left. Meanwhile, the Israelis had only two missile-armed boats left, as Reshef’s fire control system had malfunctioned, Mivtah still lacked missile armament, and Hanit had detached to finish off K-123 with shellfire.

The Osa managed to launch two more missiles at the charging Israeli ships before it, and a Komar was destroyed by four out of eight Gabriel missiles fired by Ga’ash and Mezanek. A third damaged Komar intentionally ran aground and was abandoned by its crew. Mezanek darted forth, dodging 130-millimeter shells from coastal guns to destroy the abandoned vessel with 40-millimeter autocannon rounds.

Additional Syrian missile boats, as well as ground-based anti-ship batteries, remained at Latakia por,t protected from radar-guided weapons by the clutter produced by port facilities and nearby civilian shipping. But that cut two ways: Syrian missiles launched all missed, with two striking international merchant ships at their piers.

While the Israeli boats then withdrew, the Syrian Navy mostly kept to the safety of the harbor for the remainder of the war, save for some small-scale hit-and-run missile attacks. Two days later, Israel’s Navy sank six Egyptian missile boats at the Battle of Baltim using similar tactics.

Hoping to finish off Syria’s surviving missile boats, Barkai launched a second raid on October 11 involving seven Sa’ar boats targeting fuel storage facilities at Latakia, Bania,s and Mina al-Baida. The ensuing two-hour Second Battle of Latakia proved less conclusive: while counter-attacking Syrian boats and coastal missile batteries again missed every shot, so did most Israeli Gabriel missiles—save for two that sank international merchant ships at port, a hit on fuel stores in Banias, and two possible hits claimed on Syrian missile boats.

Though the Syrian Navy proved its willingness to fight defensively, it had little further impact on the war. The Yom Kippur War ended without one of the 54 P-15 missiles fired by Egypt or Syria, hitting a naval target. 

In subsequent years, Syria acquired ten improved Osa-II boats able to fire P-15M missiles with twice the range to 50 miles, three dated Soviet Romeo-class submarines briefly used for anti-submarine training before being scrapped in the 1990s, and Tir-II missile boats from Iran carrying two missiles each. 21st-century plans to acquire three Russian Amur or Lada-class submarines all foundered. 

The service maintained a more substantial anti-submarine aviation branch with over 20 Mi-14 and Ka-28 helicopters.

During the early phase of the Syrian civil war, the navy’s boats allegedly joined tanks in shelling protesting civilians in Latakia. But from then on, the service played a minor role in the massively destructive civil war that followed.

Historical References Utilized in the Creation of this Article 

The Syrian Arab Navy

Re-examining the Syrian Navy

From Futuristic Whimsy to Naval Reality

The Boats of Cherbourg (Abraham Rabinovich)

Israeli Warships

About the Author: Sebastien A. Roblin

Sébastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com, War is Boring and 19FortyFive, where he is Defense-in-Depth editor.  He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You can follow his articles on Twitter.