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Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may be the chief casualty of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s capture of Damascus, but he may not be alone.

Just as the Arab Spring began in Tunisia but then steamrolled through the region claiming the scalps of the leaders of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. The same dynamics that contributed to Assad’s fall—conscript armies, corruption, and stagnant or declining living standards among ordinary citizens—are present in other countries: Iran, Egypt, Azerbaijan, and Jordan, for example. 

Jordan’s King Abdullah II especially should be very worried. Like Former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, King Abdullah II is much more popular outside his country than inside. Too often, Washington think tank scholars and international correspondents allow their desire for access to skew their perspective.

While the Syrian rebels who seized Damascus and ended the Assad family’s 53-year reign of terror continue their efforts to reassure the West that they will govern with tolerance and respect, they suggest something different to their own people. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani deliberately chose the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus rather than the presidential palace or parliament as the site of his victory declaration for its symbolism: It was the seat of a caliphate and suggests Jawlani sees himself more as a caliph seeking religious rule rather than a politician accountable to his people. Aleppo’s Christians, who know HTS better than the Western diplomats, pundits, and journalists, took the hint; already they are fleeing to Armenia rather than face a Turkish-backed Islamist regime.

Just as Western officials who sought to judge Hezbollah absent acknowledgement of its deep ties to Iran looked foolish and hobbled the utility of their analysis, so too do those who want to judge HTS absent any acknowledgment of its Turkish sponsorship. There is a reason why rebels (or their Turkish advisors) draped the Turkish flag over Aleppo’s citadel.

The likelihood that Sunni Islamists will dominate the new Syria is near certain. So too will Syria’s foreign policy change. Turkish domination and Sunni Islamism will likely make align Syria toward Hamas. Turkey may encourage such a shift, as cultivating Syria as a safe-haven for Hamas enables President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to maintain plausible deniability for his own terror support.

Israel should certainly be concerned, given Erdogan’s outspoken animosity toward the Jewish state and his robust support for Hamas. Israel can likely take care of itself, however. It has secured the Israel-Syria border, and the Israeli economy remains robust. The average Israeli citizen believes he will become more affluent with time, not less. 

The same is not true with Jordan. Many Jordanians look at the profligate lifestyle of the king and especially Queen Rania with disdain. As their children age, their own ritzy lifestyles chafe. While the Jordanian economy grows, many Jordanians remain unhappy about their current situation. Revolutions—both in Iran and Egypt—occurred when the economy was growing, not when recession loomed. 

Decades of relative poverty primes Jordanians toward extremism. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Iraqi Sunni insurgents from 2003 until his 2006 death, was both Jordanian and more the rule rather than the exception in certain corners of the country. That Jordan is majority Palestinians, too, also makes the kingdom vulnerable. Neither Erdogan nor HTS have to worry about Hamas seeking power in Turkey or Syria because Hamas is movement that fuses Islamism with Palestinian nationalism. Jordan, however, comprises more than 70 percent of historic Palestine by territory, and is two-thirds Palestinian by demography. Hamas resonates inside Jordan. 

It was one thing for Queen Rania to carry water for Hamas earlier this year in Congress when the group was isolated in Gaza, separated from Jordan by Israel itself. Now that Turkey may enable Hamas to use Syria as its new base, it is an entirely different story. Abdullah II may not fall—neither Israel nor the United States want that outcome—but he nevertheless has a target on his back, and like his great-grandfather and namesake, he may not survive. 

Jordan is a cornerstone of the moderate Arab coalition and a country upon which the United States relies disproportionately in its support for regional security and peace. It is for this reason as well that many Islamists hate the country. Just the Assad’s fall sent reverberations throughout the region, Jordan’s fall could be as momentous, putting extremists on Israel’s border and enabling a new land bridge for the region’s reactionaries to take their terror to Israel’s borders.

About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin 

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics. The author’s views are his own.