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The dominant fact of 21st century political life is the Great Sort–Americans separating themselves into increasingly distinct camps, red and blue, by state. This has obvious implications for the Senate. Kyle Kondik has an interesting analysis at

Imagine a world in which the Dakotas sent four Democrats to the Senate, and Florida and West Virginia both sent two. And, at the same time, Colorado was represented by two Republicans, while 14 states had split delegations. That was only 24 years ago.

Today, the Senate map falls along more starkly ideological lines:

There are 20 states—which account for 40 Senate seats in total—that have voted Republican for president in at least every presidential election this century, and Donald Trump won all of them by double-digit margins in 2024. …

For the first time in the history of Senate popular elections, Republicans will hold all 40 of the Senate seats from these states after flipping Montana and West Virginia.

Five other states—Florida, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, and Ohio—have more often than not voted Republican for president this century, including backing Trump in all 3 of his elections. Republicans also will hold all of the Senate seats in these states, following Sen. Sherrod Brown’s (D-OH) loss in November. That in addition to the 20 states identified on Map 1 equals 25 states, or half of the entire membership of the Senate (50 seats).

What we are seeing here is less quirkiness, less focus on personality and political skill, and a sharper ideological divide. This is the Senate map post-2024 election:

Now, there are only three states with split delegations. And on paper, it is Democratic senators who are likely to be imperiled:

Democrats now hold 10 seats in states Trump won in 2024: both seats in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Nevada and a seat apiece in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Granted, we just saw the best Republican presidential performance in 20 years, but this does help illustrate the Democratic challenge in the Senate: They have been doing better in the most competitive presidential states than the Republicans, but they still will find themselves in the minority next year.

On paper, the GOP has the edge in the Senate, since there are more right-leaning than left-leaning states. Democratic voters are concentrated in a handful of large states–California, New York, Illinois, New Jersey–while the more thinly-populated states are mostly Republican. Democrats have remained competitive in the Senate, in part because Republicans have nominated some poor candidates. But in the current era, Democrats are fighting a rear-guard action. South Dakota won’t be electing a Democratic senator any time soon, while the odds against Georgia continuing to send two Democrats to the Senate are long.

In 2026, there are 22 Republican seats up, and only 13 Democrats. But if you look at the map at the link, the picture is not bleak for the GOP: few of those 22 seats are in vulnerable states. Some of the seats the Democrats need to defend are tougher, but on the whole, it doesn’t look like there is likely to be much, if any, change in 2026.

So the Great Sort continues apace. The GOP has a slight built-in advantage in the Senate, but that edge could be neutralized by the Democrats’ vast financial resources and their control over most of the means of communication and the federal bureaucracy.

The more fundamental question, which I won’t address for now, is whether the Great Sort renders futile the entire notion of a United States that includes both its red zones–pro-America, pro-Constitutional government, pro-free enterprise, indifferent to race–and its blue zones–anti-American, anti-Constitution, socialist and racist. On what basis, exactly, can we form a common polity?

That question may become acute much sooner than most observers realize.