We support our Publishers and Content Creators. You can view this story on their website by CLICKING HERE.

Key Points: The Russian Air Force, while criticized early in the Ukraine War for failing to secure air superiority, has demonstrated resilience and adaptability. Despite losing around 10% of its aircraft, glide bomb tactics and reduced Ukrainian anti-air defenses near the frontlines have enhanced operational safety and effectiveness.

-Legacy aircraft like the Su-34 and Su-35 continue to bolster forces, but advanced programs like the Su-57 stealth fighter and PAK DA bomber face production and technological hurdles, particularly due to sanctions.

-With F-16s soon arriving in Ukraine, Russia’s Aerospace Forces may face new challenges, yet they remain relatively intact compared to other branches of its military.

Russia’s Air Force in Ukraine: Resilience Amidst Challenges

Russia’s Air Force, also known as the Russian Aerospace Forces, has had a mixed record in Ukraine. Castigated in the early months of the war for failing to achieve air superiority and failing to inflict decisive damage on defending Ukrainian ground forces, Russian air assets contributed mightily to the successful Russian defense against Ukraine’s summer 2023 offensive and have made a major contribution to the success of Russian ground advances over the past several months.

Having avoided the dreadful losses suffered by naval and land units, the Aerospace Forces may well emerge from the war with their reputation and force structure mostly intact.

Ukraine vs. Russia’s Air Force 

Russian air forces have not suffered nearly the same level of attrition in the Ukraine War as land or naval forces.

A US estimate of Russian aerial strength as of April 2024 estimated that Russia had lost some 10% of its total aviation strength in the first twenty-six months of the war, amounting to an expensive inconvenience but not an operational crisis. Most of these aircraft have been lost to Ukrainian surface-to-air missile systems, although some have suffered from deep drone and missile strikes against Russian bases.

Su-57 and Su-75 Side-by-Side. Image Credit: Rostec.

In recent months, glide bomb tactics, in which Russian fighter-bombers release heavy bombs on a glide path towards Ukrainian defenses, have proven effective not only at inflicting losses on Ukrainian forces at the front but also in keeping Russian aircraft relatively safe.

The relocation of significant anti-air assets to the protection of cities to reduce the effectiveness of Russia’s strategic drone and missile campaigns has also made it safer for Russian tactical aircraft to operate near the front.

New Production

Russia’s defense industry continues to supply updated versions of legacy aircraft. United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) recently delivered two batches  (2-4 aircraft each) of Su-35S fighters, and last year delivered three batches of Su-34 fighter bombers.

Tu-160 Bomber from Russian Air Force. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Tu-160 Bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Russia also resumed production of the Tu-160 strategic bomber in the 2010s, with several scheduled to enter service over the next few years.

While this production is far from overwhelming it is probably enough to fill Russia’s wartime needs unless aircraft attrition increases substantially.

Russia has managed to import sophisticated foreign components despite the sanctions regime imposed by the West. That Russia has been able to reconstitute supply chains (also affected by the 2014 break with Ukraine and ensuing sanctions regime) is a tribute to the ingenuity of Russia’s state smuggling operation, although it has probably limited Russian access to the most cutting edge components.

Russia’s Air Force and the Future: Su-57 and PAK DA

Prospects for the next generation of Russian combat aircraft look less rosy.

Russia’s entry into the Fifth Generation Fighter Sweepstakes, the Su-57 “Felon,” has not yet seen much success in combat or on the export market. The Felon has not played a significant role in the Ukraine War (the war does not favor its air superiority-heavy capabilities), although it has engaged in escort of some strike missions. Unlike the F-35 it does not seem to have an independent strike role in its mission portfolio.

The Ukrainians managed to damage at least one with a long-range strike, although the status of the aircraft is unknown. Total numbers of Su-57s available seem to be around three dozen, although reports vary and Russia has not been forthcoming with useful information.

Su-57 Stealth. Russian Air Force.

AL-41F1 engine compressor stall at MAKS-2011.

The restriction of sophisticated electronics imports and the diversion of what imports can be had to missile programs have hit the Su-57 program particularly hard.

The fate of the PAK DA, Russia’s stealth bomber, is more murky. Russia is obviously well behind both the United States and China on this project, as no prototype has yet flown. Although Russia has claimed that the PAK DA includes no foreign components, this claim is not credible for a technologically advanced stealth bomber. In any case the PAKDA does not seem to be a priority of Russia aerospace production at the moment.

Russia’s Aerospace Forces at the Crossroads 

The ongoing transfer of F-16s to Ukraine could make the skies more dangerous for Russian aircraft. Still, Ukraine will not have the Vipers in numbers until at least next year, and it will take time to adapt them for an air superiority mission, much less force Russian aircraft into engagements. If attrition rates do increase significantly, it could put pressure on the industry, as well as force the deployment of additional Su-57s.

In any case, while Russia’s air forces and aerospace industry are in a much better place than Russia’s navy and shipbuilding industry, Russia still risks falling far behind its competitors in the export market. Russia’s new projects are technologically less mature than those of China and will, for a very long time, carry the risk of significant sanctions for customers.

Nevertheless, Russia’s aerospace industry should be able to keep the Russian Aerospace Forces viable for the foreseeable future.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.