Yoon’s Downfall: What It Means for Donald Trump’s Asia Strategy

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President Yoon Suk-yeol’s political self-immolation has decapitated the South Korean government and enfeebled its alliance with Washington. Yoon has been impeached and will likely be removed from office. The opposition Democratic Party (DP) then impeached acting President Han Duck-soo, making the finance minister the new acting president. However, the enraged DP has also threatened the latter with impeachment. Will there be anyone in Seoul for President Donald Trump to call after his inauguration?

Yoon’s Exit: A Changed South Korea? 

Yoon’s fate is now before the Constitutional Court. If he is ousted, as expected, an election will be held within 60 days. The opposition is very likely to triumph. If so, South Korean policy will change dramatically, forcing Trump to adjust his objectives accordingly. The Republic of Korea is likely to soften its stance toward North Korea and China while stiffening its attitude toward Japan. Seoul will probably reject tougher sanctions against Russia while encouraging the Trump administration to reengage with Pyongyang. And a progressive administration will be more likely to reject demands for increased host nation support and perhaps risk a US troop withdrawal.

Yoon’s victory two years ago was extremely narrow, but he was feted in Washington for essentially becoming one with Washington in foreign policy. The consummation of the new US-South Korea understanding was Yoon’s celebrated rendition of “American Pie” during his April 2023 visit to Washington. Then came his plan to impose military rule in peacetime, a plan so deficient as to collapse in six hours. The resulting ruin of the Yoon presidency—even if he survives in office, his authority has dissipated—almost certainly means a sharp move left in Seoul. That would have been a minor catastrophe for the Biden administration which, despite its progressive leanings, much preferred a hard-right partner in Seoul.

In contrast, in some areas, Trump might find South Korea’s left to be more compatible.

A Shaken Military 

Even before the latest events, the ROK army suffered from a birth dearth, poor recruitment, salary compression, high attrition, and poor leadership. Yoon might have been more ready to address these problems, especially having relied on the armed forces to seize power. However, the autogolpe has made progressives even more nervous about the role of the military, given its history.

The incoming government will confront a military badly shaken by Yoon’s attempted putsch. Readiness likely has suffered. KoreaPro cited an erosion of morale that “undermines trust within the ranks and threatens operational cohesion, critical for countering North Korean threats and maintaining alliance credibility.” Troops involved in Yoon’s plot have suffered the most. Several commanders and generals have been suspended or removed.

The US-ROK Alliance Changing 

Irrespective of party, South Koreans take the alliance with America for granted. Although some left-wing activists want US forces to leave progressive presidents going back to Kim Dae-jung have backed the “Mutual” Defense Treaty. Nevertheless, the DP might look to develop independent ROK military options and push to transfer operational control to Seoul.

However, Donald Trump has never been enamored of the bilateral relationship and threatened to withdraw American troops. Even though the Biden administration rushed through renewal of the Special Measures Agreement, Trump has demanded $10 billion a year to maintain a US presence. Reports suggest that Yoon was willing to offer something more than the $1.14 billion agreed to by Biden, but a new progressive president is more likely to say no more. Then what?

During his first term, Trump’s bark usually proved worse than his bite, and the US troops stayed. However, he apparently has learned after his own officials undercut his policy goals. If rebuffed by Seoul, he might resurrect his troop withdrawal proposal and even begin a partial withdrawal. Zack Cooper of the American Enterprise Institute predicted that Yoon’s likely departure “opens up the door for substantial US troop reductions from South Korea.” Which some progressives might embrace.

South Korean Nuclear Ambitions

Extended deterrence, by which Washington promises to use nuclear weapons to defend the South, was credible when any war would stay on the Korean peninsula. However, the North now has nuclear weapons and missiles of increasing range. Even Yoon admitted: “What we call extended deterrence was also the US telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything, but now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that.” He recognized that once the American homeland is in range the US will have to consider whether South Korea’s defense is worth risking the incineration of American cities.

Although Yoon accepted the Washington Declaration as affirming America’s commitment, Biden’s promises will look tattered if the alliance cracks and US personnel start going home. Mason Richey, at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, warned that the debate “will be significantly affected by how the Trump administration approaches the alliance with South Korea and how it approaches the relationship with North Korea.” Political analyst Cheong Seong-chang went further, declaring: “The reelection of Trump is an opportunity for South Korea to create its own nuclear weapons.”

A popular majority in the South has long favored doing so, though “strategic elites” are significantly less supportive. Liberals have been most likely to reject the idea. Hence, predicted John Lee of KoreaPro, a DP administration instead would “likely focus on strengthening conventional military capabilities, exploring nuclear submarine technology and leveraging its alliance with the U.S. and partnerships with other countries to maintain regional stability.” However, if faced with a Washington demand for billions of dollars annually and threat to withdraw American forces while Kim refuses conciliation and continues to build his arsenal, DP leaders might rethink their position. Especially if Trump does not object to such a course, having previously mooted the possibility.

The US-South Korea-Japan Triangle

Nearly eight decades after the ROK was freed from Tokyo’s control, relations between the two neighbors remain fraught. Washington has encouraged creation of an informal three-sided alliance and conservatives like Yoon were always more willing to forget and even forgive the past. With American support, he worked assiduously to build a relationship with successive Japanese premiers. In July defense ministers from the three nations agreed to create an institutional framework for trilateral cooperation.

However, DP leader Lee Jae-myung and other progressives have been sharply critical. He rejects military coordination with Tokyo and charged Yoon with “choosing the path of a lackey of Japan” and “selling out his national interests and national pride to Japan.” The Tokyo-Seoul relationship depends upon current relations, not a treaty or long-established practice, and was fragile even under Yoon. South Korean diplomats complained to me that Japan didn’t provide them with deliverables that would have made it easier to sell the new relationship to the ROK public. In November the two governments clashed over dueling remembrances of Korean victims of forced labor at the Sado gold mine.

If the left replaces Yoon, Seoul certainly will downgrade relations. Indeed, the South might return to the cold standoff under former president Moon Jae-in, reviving squabbles over payments to victims of Imperial Japan and more. Trump has shown far less interest in allied relations, and without strong prodding from Washington even Tokyo is less likely to invest in the relationship.

North Korea Policy

Pyongyang closed the door to the ROK after the failure of the Hanoi summit. The Yoon government made no effort to maintain an opening for dialogue. Even worse, Yoon apparently attempted to create a military incident to prepare his declaration of martial law.

The Biden administration was no more willing to offer any new initiatives. However, Trump is evidently proud of his opening to the North. Whether his relationship with Kim remains as friendly as the former believes—he said he would get along with Kim “when I’m back in office”—is not clear. North Korea indicated little interest in whether Trump was reelected. However, if he was willing to talk without demanding that Pyongyang commit to denuclearization, Kim would have a greater incentive to engage the ROK as well as US.

Yoon would not likely have favored such an approach, having taken a tough position in response to the North’s rejection of reunification. However, the left favors a revived inter-Korean dialogue despite Kim’s official disinterest. In November, the DP’s Lee contended that “The government should come up with a detailed strategy to keep pace with the rapidly changing global situation” and prevent Seoul from being sidelined by Washington and Pyongyang. KoreaPro’s Lee predicted that “The DP may pivot to indirect engagement through humanitarian aid or confidence-building measures, aiming to reduce tensions without direct talks. Efforts to restart joint economic projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, could resurface but are unlikely to materialize given Pyongyang’s current posture.” In this area, at least, the expected change in government could improve coordination between Seoul and Washington.

Balancing Against China

The South Korean public has become sharply critical of the PRC, dating back to the latter’s harsh response to the 2017 deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. Yoon shares this attitude and acted accordingly. In October he visited the Philippines, and agreed to create a “strategic partnership” with Manila. His government was considering becoming a “cooperating partner” to AUKUS Pillar II. Seoul also showed interest in working with the Quad, perhaps turning it into the Quin.

As such, Yoon was a better match for Trump, who has loaded his administration with China hawks. In contrast, the DP is more interested in conciliating Beijing. With the ROK dependent on China as a source of rare earth elements and market for semiconductor chips, Lee or another DP president likely would try to separate South Korea from America’s harsh economic policy toward China. A new DP-led government might even reconsider the THAAD deployment.

The current opposition also is less likely to cooperate with the Quad, though Lee indicated a desire for the nuclear submarines promised to Australia as part of AUKUS. Moreover, he dismissed Washington’s position on Taiwan: “Why do we care about what happens to the Taiwan Strait?” Here the DP might be in luck: Trump’s support for the island, which he also has criticized for taking advantage of America, is less certain than Biden’s.

Becoming a European Power

Yoon’s ambitions appeared to extend well beyond the Pacific. His government participated in NATO meetings, inviting the transatlantic alliance to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific. KoreaPro quoted a bevy of unnamed experts lauding Seoul’s qualification to lead NATO’s partnership activities in the region. The Korea Risk Group’s Joon Ha Park reported: “At the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels on Oct. 17, South Korea’s Vice Defense Minister Kim Seonho took the opportunity to outline specific proposals to enhance cooperation between NATO and the so-called IP4 nations, including strengthening strategic information sharing, deepening defense collaboration and coordinating responses to regional security challenges.”

Moreover, Seoul joined the anti-Russia coalition, imposing sanctions, and Yoon visited Kyiv. After Moscow introduced DPRK troops in combat, he contemplated sending a monitoring mission to Ukraine. He also said he was “considering providing weapons to Ukraine on a ‘step-by-step’ basis as a warning,” though the opposition of some 88 percent of South Koreans caused even Yoon to hesitate.

This policy likely will change under a DP administration. Lee probably would recognize that in a war with the North, the only serious existential threat facing the ROK, the transatlantic alliance would be of little use. And while Seoul has good reason to sympathize with Ukraine, getting entangled in that conflict would risk Russian retaliation through the North. In fact, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko warned that Moscow would “respond in every way that we find necessary.” In 2023 the DP issued a statement on behalf of opposition National Assembly members of the National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees strongly opposing “military support to Ukraine.” They added that “it would be an extremely dangerous decision for our country to turn Russia into an enemy by directly supporting Ukraine.” Although a new government probably would not abandon sanctions, which would cause problems with Europe and the US, it would be unlikely to enhance them.

Overall, Philip Turner, earlier a New Zealand ambassador to Seoul, suggested that Lee might choose “a more independent approach, less focused on security, less anchored to the U.S.” Thus, progressives likely would focus on Asia and continue Yoon’s largely economic engagement with ASEAN countries, Singapore, and Pacific Islands, while possibly downplaying maritime security initiatives that seem directed at Beijing. They also would encourage commerce beyond, such as in Africa and the Middle East.

Meeting Protectionist Pressures

The incoming Trump administration has threatened to impose tariffs on friends and foes alike. During his first term Trump forced renegotiation of the free trade agreement with Seoul. He may well seek a second bite of the apple, especially since he believes the ROK has been taking advantage of America’s troop presence.

The DP is likely to resist—Washington’s legislated preference for US-built electrical vehicles still rankles—and look to develop alternative markets to reduce its dependence on the US. Seoul has been seeking free trade agreements with several Asian states. It is likely to pursue additional regional as well as bilateral accords and also might rely more on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an Asian free trade agreement. Softer on China generally, a progressive president also likely would, as noted earlier, resist ever tightening US restrictions on the sale of semiconductor chips and other hi-tech products to the PRC. Given Trump’s focus on trade, these issues could prove as contentious as the Special Measures Agreement.

In one area the DP is likely to be more restrictive on trade. In order to prevent the Yoon government from providing military assistance to Russia, the National Assembly was considering restrictive legislation on arms exports. This measure could affect South Korean sales elsewhere, such as in Latin America and the Middle East. Warned KoreaPro’s Lee: “If successful, the proposed restrictions could impact South Korea’s defense sector in multiple areas, from economic growth and research and development (R&D) to strategic partnerships.”

South Korea has survived a succession of political challenges and international crises since turning to democracy in 1987. Most of its presidents have been impeached or imprisoned. Yoon might end up both. After the impeachment of the acting president—the Constitutional Court will have to decide whether the National Assembly met the constitutional vote requirement—the ROK will face months without even the pretense of stable government.

If a new president is eventually installed the impact on ROK policy will be profound. Dealing with this change will be one of the most important responsibilities of the incoming Trump administration and an important test of what his policy of American First means in practice.

About the Author: Doug Bandow 

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.