North Korea’s Russia Alliance and Missiles are a Big Problem for Trump and Allies

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North Korea fired a shot across the stern of the outgoing Biden administration by launching a missile during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to South Korea. Blinken was in Seoul to affirm U.S. support for its ally despite ongoing political turmoil wrought by President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law last month and subsequent impeachment.

The missile launch also serves as a signal to the incoming Trump administration that the regime’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities would exact a higher price in any future negotiations.

On January 6, North Korea launched a missile that flew 1,100 kilometers (690 miles) before landing in the Sea of Japan. The type of missile remains unclear, but it could be the Hwasong-16, a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) which has both a conical hypersonic maneuverable warhead and wing-shaped hypersonic glide maneuverable warhead variants. Both missile versions were first tested last year and can evade missile defenses.

While the missile launch could have been conducted for additional developmental testing of a new missile, any provocation – particularly during a high-level visit – is habitually interpreted as a signal whose meaning is hotly debated by Korea watchers. Strong North Korean action could be a dismissal of rampant speculation of a resumption of U.S.-North Korean engagement during a second President Donald Trump term.

Donald Trump and North Korea: What Happens Next? 

Despite Trump’s touting his strong relationship with Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang declared last August that it was not interested in dialogue with Washington regardless of the presidential election result. The regime declared that both candidates reflected Washington’s “unchanging aggressive and hostile policy.” The last bilateral U.S.-North Korean diplomatic meeting was in October 2019.

Kim has been emboldened by stronger ties with Russia including a mutual defense signed last year in a summit with President Vladimir Putin. Pyongyang has provided millions of artillery rounds, weapons, and 12,000 troops to support Russian operations in Ukraine, receiving an estimated $6 billion in benefits in return. Russian largesse, which enables Pyongyang to offset the impact of international sanctions, comes without any preconditions as would be required in any nuclear deal with the United States.

Conversely, the road to negotiations with North Korea in the past has often first passed through a crisis, with the regime escalating tensions in order to revert to the status quo ante and raise the price of an eventual settlement. Some experts speculate that Kim could conduct North Korea’s seventh nuclear test near Trump’s inauguration, though both Washington and Seoul declared such a test was imminent since March 2022.

Regardless of Pyongyang’s intended message, the missile launch underscores the importance of trilateral security cooperation amongst the United States, South Korea, and Japan. A few short months ago, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan were like three strong horses harnessed together, pulling in the same direction. Foreign and security policies among the three countries were in near total alignment. The biggest uncertainty was potential U.S. policy changes under a second Trump term.

But now Japan has been weakened by new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s feckless decision to call a snap election in October that led to his party losing its legislative majority for the first time in 15 years. The Japanese ship of state may still be heading in the same direction as before, but the sails are luffing. Its captain must now put all policy issues to a vote by the crew, having to gain agreement from opposition parties for passage of any legislation including funding for Japan’s pledged doubling of defense spending.

Hwasong-12 IRBM. Image Credit: North Korea State Media.

The South Korean ship of state ran aground due to Yoon’s unwarranted declaration of martial law. The constitutional system, commendably enough, prevailed, but the nation is in tumult after the impeachment of Yoon and acting President Han Duck-soo, and a lengthening list of arrests of senior officials. The opposition party has now moved beyond a ship’s crew revolting against unconstitutional actions by the captain and is now engaged in a retributive mutiny against the norms of political rule.

If Yoon’s impeachment is upheld by the Constitutional Court, the progressive opposition Democratic Party will likely win a special presidential election. The new president would return to the party’s conciliatory outreach to China and North Korea, aggressive nationalist policy toward Japan, and downplaying South Korea’s alliance with the United States.

Yoon’s bold and politically risky outreach to Japan, despite fierce domestic criticism, was commendable and single-handedly brought about South Korean-Japanese reconciliation and resurgence of trilateral military coordination with the U.S. But his recent actions jeopardize all of the gains made in recent years in forging common allied responses to regional security challenges.

The incoming Trump administration will be looking for reliable allies and partners for confronting the growing Chinese and North Korean threats. Until recently, both South Korea and Japan were seen as sturdy and dependable allies. But the United States is now allied with two foundering ships of state even as Washington debates setting its own course in the Indo-Pacific. We have likely seen the high-water mark of trilateralism, and prospects for policy success are dimmer than just a few short months ago.

About the Author: Bruce Klingner

Bruce Klingner is senior research fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. He served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea.