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Donald Trump returns to the White House when the war in Ukraine is going badly for Kyiv. Russia is decisively advancing along the entire eastern front while its forces are pushing back Ukrainian forces in Kursk. Russia is moving deliberatively along all fronts, its pace accelerating primarily due to the growing weakness of Ukrainian forces.
The incoming American President has said he plans to quickly conclude the war while his representatives speak of ceasefire proposals. Trump has said he wants to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Putin has indicated his willingness to do so. Trump will come to such a meeting with a head of steam from his return to power, believing that his 2024 electoral victory has given him a mandate to promote his policy preferences in a myriad of foreign and domestic areas, the Ukraine war being one of them.
Donald Trump Confronts a Hard Reality in the Ukraine War
However, Trump confronts a Russian President who is now in the driver’s seat in the Ukraine war.
Russian forces are poised to retake Kursk and move into the adjoining Ukrainian oblast of Sumy. In contrast, more massive Russian forces along the eastern front are poised to take all the remaining territory in the already annexed four regions. Nearly all of the powerful Kiev-fortified cities to the east have fallen to Russian forces.
If and when Trump and Putin meet, Putin will hold most of the cards, and Trump will have limited maneuvering room. In this reality, how does Donald Trump bring peace to Ukraine?
Donald Trump is a mercurial leader, and there are a number of contradictory directions in which he could move as he engages Putin. Trump could push for a ceasefire, setting out “carrots and sticks” to encourage a positive Russian reply. Yet senior Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have already rejected such ceasefire thinking, arguing Russia will only consider a comprehensive set of security guarantees for Europe that far transcend arrangements just for Ukraine.
Those around Trump indicate that a Russian rejection of a Trump proposal could dramatically increase American financial and military support for Kyiv, thus promising a continuation of the conflict. But Russian forces would continue to take more territory; peace would not be achieved.
On the other hand, Trump could “listen” to what the Russians have been saying about Ukraine for more than a decade. Trump could agree to Russian conditions that Ukraine not join NATO, have a small military force for defensive purposes, and remove the Stepan Bandera-inspired nationalist-extremists (what Russians call “Nazis”) that have highly influenced Ukraine since the 2014 Maidan events.
These steps would signify Ukraine operating more like Austria has for the past 75 years as a neutral and non-threatening country in the heart of Europe. The Russians could offer Trump a face-saving arrangement wherein a rump Ukrainian state, minus Crimea and the four eastern oblasts, remains. Such a resetting of the Ukrainian domestic scene would be at the core of new security arrangements for Europe that the Americans and Russians would construct.
However, both of these directions that Trump could pursue would entail serious challenges. The first almost certainly ensures the continuation of the war for the foreseeable future; there would be no peace for Ukraine, and Russia would likely move toward a military victory. The second would be adamantly opposed by the American political establishment, including many Republicans. It would be seen as selling out to an aggressor.
Peace at What Price for Ukraine?
Meeting Russian conditions could well bring peace to Ukraine, but at what cost?
For the transaction-oriented Trump who has higher foreign policy priorities than Ukraine (e.g., Israel and China), cutting a deal that leaves Ukraine stable and at peace, but outside of the Western political-military system, might be acceptable.
Trump has never shown any special interest in Ukraine, and he could focus his attention on the Middle East and Asia. But achieving such a peace, more on Russian terms and with the attendant cost, may be more than even the brash Donald Trump can consider.
Bringing peace to Ukraine with a new American administration remains elusive.
About the Author: John P. Willerton
John P. (Pat) Willerton is a professor of political science at the University of Arizona whose professional interests focus on comparative politics, with attention to Russia and other FSU (Former Soviet Union) countries. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan, began his career at Michigan State University, and joined the University of Arizona in 1988. His research and teaching interests are primarily concentrated on Russian elite politics, the Russian federal executive, semi-presidentialism in Russia and France, and Russia’s relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and FSU countries. He is the author of a scholarly book and 50 articles and chapters. He regularly teaches the large lecture general education “Politics of Happiness” course, upper-division courses on Russian domestic politics, Russian foreign policy, and comparative political elites (with emphasis on Russia, France, Iran, and the U.S.). His graduate course offerings regularly include a comparative politics proseminar and an occasional advanced seminar on Russian and FSU politics.