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Four years ago, in January 2020, a US drone carried out a strike in Iraq near Baghdad International Airport, killing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. Alongside Soleimani was Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a veteran leader of Kataib Hezbollah, one of the key Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. The death of Muhandis in the same attack could have been a major blow to Iran’s ambitions in Iraq. However, after the attack, the militias were able to continue their role throughout the country. Today, these militias face a potential new reality in the Middle East in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.

This is important because the militias have spent the last four years shifting between threatening US troops in Iraq and Syria and pulling back every time they fear that their provocations may result in significant pushback. The Iranian-backed militias in Iraq comprise a number of important groups. They generally fall under the umbrella of what is called the Popular Mobilization Forces or Hashd al-Shaabi. This organization was formed in 2014 as part of the war on ISIS. However, many of its components pre-date ISIS’ 2014 creation and have roots tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Iran’s backing for Shi’ite groups in the region.

The militias in Iraq should be seen as part of Iran’s network of proxies and allies in the Middle East, along with Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The proxies and allies in Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asaib Ahl al Haq, and the larger Badr Organization. Each of these groups has different attributes and specialties. For instance, Kataib Hezbollah used a drone to kill three American soldiers in Jordan in January 2024.

Today, the militias find themselves in a bind. These groups are accustomed to working in a region with few setbacks. The US drone strike in January 2020 was a setback, but in general, they felt they could attack US forces and also threaten Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other countries.

The groups sent fighters into Syria, for instance. Kataib Hezbollah even established a local headquarters in Albukamal, Syria. When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the militias mobilized to attack US forces. Then, they shifted gears and began drone attacks on Israel under the guise of a new group they called the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” By October 2024, they had increased their attacks on Israel.

As Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and groups like Hamas, took a beating from Israel’s war effort, the Iraqi militias looked like they might play a more significant role in November and December 2024. However, they were in for a surprise when the Assad regime suddenly fell on December 8. The militias had already begun to receive pushback due to the increasing spotlight on their drone attacks on Israel. The attacks were also becoming more deadly. Two Israeli soldiers were killed and two dozen wounded in an attack in October.

The militias found themselves facing a major setback as the Assad regime fell. They could no longer operate in Iraq, where they could easily cross the border near Al Qaim in Iraq, across from Albukamal in Syria. The regime change removed their ability to threaten US forces in the Middle Euphrates River Valley.

It also led to them rethinking what they might do next in Iraq. A recent report at The New Arab indicates the militias have halted their attacks on Israel, and they may pull back from the Iraqi border with Syria.

This new stance is an important shift and provides an opening in the region to confront some key threats present in Iraq and Syria. The Iranian-backed militias ended up in eastern Syria via Albukamal, the border crossing that sits on the Euphrates River as the river enters Iraq.

This entry point is a critical area. Across the river in Baghuz is where ISIS made its last stand against the US-led Coalition Operation Inherent Resolve and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. ISIS didn’t disappear; it still exists in desert areas in this same region of Syria and Iraq.

This strategic crossing is vital for another reason. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Syrian regime enabled foreign fighters who wanted to enter Iraq by letting them flow down the Euphrates valley. They moved down this valley through villages where tribes often had connections to Iraq. Iraqi politics influenced some of the tribes here to such a degree that back in the 1980s and 1990s, they used to follow Saddam’s regime as closely as they followed developments in Damascus.

The Assad regime exploited this to harm Americans in Iraq in the 2000s. After the defeat of ISIS in 2018-2019 the militias in Iraq moved the other way, up the valley into Syria. Now, this same area that once helped Sunnis who supported the insurgency in Iraq began to be a waystation for Shi’ite militias.

With the fall of the Assad regime, things may change again. However, this unsettled area could lead to destabilizing influences in both Iraq and Syria. The US role in eastern Syria is a potential lynchpin for stability and a way to keep Iraq’s militias in check. In addition, the US maintains a force at Tanf, a garrison in southern Syria near the Iraqi and Jordanian border. The US trained a force of former Syrian rebels in this location. The group is called the Syrian Free Army (not to be confused with the Free Syrian Army).

The US role at Tanf and the role of these US-trained forces who have experience fighting in the desert between Palmyra and the Iraqi border could help keep ISIS in check and provide another avenue for stability.

Image: Creative Commons.

The Iraqi militias have faced a setback. Iran has faced a setback. The new Syrian government seeks to unify myriad groups into a new military force. This will take time. Meanwhile, the US has troops in eastern Syria and at Tanf, and the role of the SDF and Syrian Free Army can help fill the power vacuum to some degree. What matters now is what happens across the border in Iraq. Iraq’s federal government appears to be stepping up along the border in Anbar province and areas such as Al Qaim.

This is important. The pressure on the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq should continue. They should not be allowed to seep back into the border region and return to the old days when they used to launch rockets and drones at US troops in Iraq and Syria. When Muhandis was killed in 2020, his removal was not exploited to reduce the role of the militias in Iraq.

Today there is a new opportunity to turn the page on the militias in Iraq.

About the Author: Seth Frantman

Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is a Senior Middle East Analyst for The Jerusalem Post. Seth is now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.