Germany’s Military Could Soon Make a Big Comeback

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Key Points and Summary: Germany’s Zeitenwende era of defense modernization faces challenges despite initial investments. While the €100 billion special fund has enabled key procurements like F-35s and new naval vessels, bureaucratic hurdles and inflation hinder progress.

-Long-term funding remains uncertain, with the 2% GDP target threatened by the debt brake and competing priorities.

-Personnel shortages and a potential increase in NATO spending targets further complicate the Bundeswehr’s revitalization. Despite these obstacles, Germany’s commitment to European security is evident in its Lithuania deployment and strategic reorientation.

Germany’s Military Reboot: Will Zeitenwende Deliver a Stronger Bundeswehr?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a dramatic shift in German defense policy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a €100 billion special fund (Sondervermögen) for the Bundeswehr in his landmark Zeitenwende speech. This decision aimed to address years of chronic underfunding that had left Germany’s military in significant deterioration and virtually incapable of defense.

Before the Zeitenwende, the Bundeswehr faced severe operational challenges. Many vehicles, aircraft, and ships were non-operational, with some reports indicating that less than half of major weapons systems were ready for deployment. Personnel shortages, inadequate ammunition stocks, and outdated equipment further complicated the military’s readiness.

The €100 billion special fund announced in the Chancellor’s speech has been directed toward several major procurement projects. A significant portion was allocated to modernizing air capabilities, including the purchase of American F-35A stealth fighters, crucial to maintaining Germany’s nuclear sharing capabilities under the auspices of NATO, as well as the development of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) alongside France and Spain. The Bundeswehr also committed to acquiring CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters to replace its aging CH-53G fleet.

In terms of land forces, Germany has invested in new Puma infantry fighting vehicles and initiated the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) project with France to develop a next-generation tank that would replace both the French Leclerc main battle tank as well as Germany’s Leopard II main battle tank. The German Navy has seen investments in new F126 frigates and Type 212CD submarines too.

That all sounds good, at least on paper. But will it be enough? And will Germany follow through on what looks like a significant reboot of its armed forces? 

The Lithuania Deployment

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, one of Germany’s most-liked politicians, has led the charge to revamp the Bundeswehr.

One of his signature projects has been Germany’s Lithuania deployment, which marks the first time since World War II that Germany has stationed a permanent military presence abroad. 

In Lithuania, NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, or eFP, is a permanently deployed combat-ready brigade of about 4,800-strong. The force represents a significant reorientation and reorganization of Germany’s military posture and is designed to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank against potential Russian aggression. Just 100 kilometers from the Russian border, German troops would be among the first to come under fire should Russia attack NATO.

Many would argue that this recent action was a step in the right direction. However, while Germany would like to become the backbone of European defense and security, Berlin faces several long-term challenges.

Bureaucratic Challenges for the German Military 

Bureaucratic procurement procedures have slowed Germany’s acquisition processes, and inflation has eaten into the purchasing power of the special €100 billion fund. 

Some projects have faced delays or cost overruns — notably the Puma infantry fighting vehicle program, which is currently addressing several design difficulties and technical challenges.

Money Problems for the German Armed Forces? 

One of the key concerns is that while the €100 billion fund represents a serious and significant investment, it may not be sufficient to address all of the long-term modernization needs of Bundeswehr. 

Many analysts argue that the fund will primarily cover existing capability gaps rather than enable comprehensive modernization or expansion of forces. German lawmakers have not provided sufficient long-term funding once the €100 billion fund runs out.

The question of sustainable long-term funding remains critical. Germany committed to meeting NATO‘s 2% GDP defense spending target, but maintaining this level after the special fund is depleted will require significant regular budget increases.

From here, things get even more complicated. Given Germany’s constitutional debt brake (Schuldenbremse) and competing domestic priorities, the challenges to keep funding flowing will only seem to grow. 

The debt brake is a constitutionally mandated restriction of deficit spending, limited to just 0.35% of GDP, and can only be surpassed in times of national emergency. Deficit spending in excess of the debt brake was allowed during the COVID-19 pandemic but has not increased defense spending — despite the outbreak of the first major war in Europe in 80 years.

Current projections suggest the special €100 billion fund will be exhausted by 2027 or 2028. The regular defense budget would need to increase substantially to maintain the two percent spending level afterward — requiring an additional €15-20 billion annually in the regular defense budget. This would be a significant spending increase that would have to be justified against other spending priorities such as badly-needed investment in infrastructure, social spending, and climate change projects.

Here Comes Donald Trump 

Further complicating the defense question in Europe is the incoming Trump administration’s expectations for defense spending.

While several NATO member states have increased their defense spending to the NATO two percent target, that metric cannot adequately address the continent’s security challenges. A new spending target may be necessary, closer to 3.5 percent of GDP.

The Bundeswehr also faces structural challenges besides just questions about long-term funding. These include problems with personnel recruitment and retention. The Bundeswehr is struggling to attract skilled personnel and competes with the private sector, which offers much more attractive benefits. The Bundeswehr also faces a cultural challenge, as military service in Germany is not regarded as positively as in the United States or elsewhere.

Limited Progress

Despite these challenges, some progress has been made. 

The Bundeswehr has begun receiving new equipment and has improved some readiness metrics. The military has also adapted its strategic planning to focus more on territorial and collective defense rather than only out-of-area operations.

Looking ahead, the success of the Bundeswehr’s modernization efforts will depend not only on the effective use of the current special fund but also on securing sustainable long-term funding and implementing structural reforms. This will require continued political commitment to defense spending and potentially difficult choices about budget priorities.

The experience also highlights broader questions about European defense capabilities and the need for greater cooperation among EU members. Germany’s efforts to modernize its military are taking place within the context of broader European defense initiatives and the evolving security relationship with the United States.

The Zeitenwende marked a significant shift in German defense policy, but translating this investment into a marked improvement in German military capabilities remains an open question. The question for Berlin now is how to balance a clear need for increases in defense spending with other spending priorities in the face of Russian revanchism and how to address this challenge once the one-off €100 runs out.

About the Author: Caleb Larson 

Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.