Ukraine’s 2024 Kursk Offensive: Lessons from World War IIs Battle of the Bulge

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A Tale of Two Counteroffensives: The Battle of the Bulge and Ukraine’s Kursk Operation: This month marks the 80th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. Though 1,500 miles separate the forests of the Ardennes and the steppes of Russia, there are similarities between the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and Ukraine’s 2024 counteroffensive at Kursk.

Both operations were spurred by the same motivation: the specter of defeat. To all but the most fanatical Nazis, it was obvious by December 1944 that the Third Reich was doomed. In the east, the Red Army had reached the German border, while the Anglo-American armies had already crossed into western Germany. It was only a matter of time before those pincers crushed the Nazi eagle.

Desperate to seize any chance of victory, Hitler and his top aides planned a bold surprise attack. The counteroffensive would hit the Ardennes region of Belgium, which was weakly defended by inexperienced American divisions.

The goal was classic blitzkrieg. Fast-moving panzer (tank) divisions would cross the Meuse River, seize the vital port of Antwerp, and split and encircle the Allied armies on the Western Front. Hitler hoped this would compel the Western Allies to make a separate peace with Germany, who would then concentrate its forces against the Soviets.

Senior German commanders were aghast at a plan that depended upon everything going like clockwork. The panzer divisions had to race down poor roads through hills and dense forests before the Allies could react. 

In the summer of 2024, Ukraine also faced a difficult choice. After two years of bitter fighting against a foe vastly superior in resources and heedless of life, the Ukrainians were barely holding their own. They could remain on the defensive in vital areas like Donetsk and fight a grim war of attrition against seemingly endless waves of Russian suicide battalions and devastating glide bombs. Instead, Kyiv opted try to keep Russia off balance by a counterattack against the thinly defended Russian lines near Kursk. This might disrupt Russian transport links, force the Kremlin to divert troops from offensive operations – and embarrass the Putin regime.

The German and Ukrainian attacks were both ably planned and well prepared, especially given that their opponents had significant aerial and signals intelligence capabilities. The Germans amassed 30 divisions with around 1,000 tanks – no small feat in late 1944. Though under severe pressure from Russian attacks to the south, Ukraine was able to deploy at least 15,000 soldiers from their best brigades in the Kursk sector.

Also remarkable was the degree of surprise.  The Germans codenamed their attack Operation Wacht am Rhein (“Watch on the Rhine”), suggesting a defensive stance behind the Rhine River. The Ukrainians planted false rumors and camouflaged troop concentrations as defensive preparations. 

The intense planning paid off. German panzer spearheads advanced up 50 miles, perilously close to capturing vital bridges over the Meuse River. For their part, Ukrainian forces managed to grab a 500-square-mile salient. 

The Allied and Russian responses were initially characterized by shock and confusion. There were some indications of offensive operations, but both seemed convinced that their opponent was too weak mount a major attack.

Yet both the Ardennes and Kursk counteroffensives ran out of steam. The U.S. rushed reinforcements to the Ardennes, most crucially two elite airborne divisions from the west and Patton’s Third Army from the south. Bad weather that grounded the Allied air forces during the first week of the battle cleared, enabling close air support and especially air attacks on German supply columns. Rather than divert forces from its Donetsk offensive, Russia assembled a hodgepodge of troops to seal off the penetration.

The weak backbone of both counteroffensives soon became manifest. By late 1944, Germany lacked enough supplies – especially gasoline – and trucks to sustain a big offensive. Hitler’s hopes that the Anglo-American partnership would fracture under pressure were dashed. British troops served as backups while the Americans counterattacked, and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was even given joint command over the northern half of the Bulge.

The relatively small Ukrainian force – the equivalent of no more than a couple of divisions – could only achieve so much against growing numbers of Russian troops heavily supported by artillery and drones. By December 2024, Moscow was also able to call upon an estimated 50,000 North Korean troops bartered by North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un in return for Russian cash and weapons.

Then came the counterattacks. Steady pressure by American troops gradually erased the German salient by late January 1945. The Ukrainians are still on Russian soil, but the salient has been reduced by half.  

Ukraine T-84 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

In the end, history will judge these two counteroffensives by their results. The verdict is in for the Battle of the Bulge: a German defeat. Though disrupting the Western Allied advance into Germany, the Ardennes offensive squandered the Third Reich’s last reserves and facilitated the Red Army’s drive on Berlin. 

The verdict on Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has yet to be rendered. It failed to divert troops from ongoing Russian attacks, yet it did divert Ukraine’s best forces from bolstering threatened sectors. On the other hand, Russia would no longer have the luxury of massing troops for major attacks and leaving the remainder of the the 600-mile-long front line lightly defended. More important, it showed that even after two years of intense combat, Ukraine was still in the fight. Whether the price was worth it remains to be seen.

About the Author: Michael Peck 

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.