REPORT: Evidence Suggests FDR Let Pearl Harbor Happen to Force America into WWII

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83 years ago yesterday, America was brought into war with what was described then, and has been described consistently since, as a “sneak attack” by Imperial Japan.

Then-President Franklin Roosevelt gave a speech on December 8th before Congress where he described it as a “Day of Infamy” where America was suddenly and deliberately attacked.

What Roosevelt failed to mention is that he knew the attack was going to happen, the government had received copious warnings about what was going to happen, and those warnings were not only ignored but steps were taken to facilitate the Japanese attack.

A series of events and factual matters strongly suggest that Roosevelt not only wanted war, but employed his top officials to help him in that effort.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Lt. Cmdr. Arthur H. McCollum wrote the eight-action-points-memo on Oct. 7, 1940 to try to get Japan to attack the United States first.

You can read the entire important McCollum memo about baiting Japan into war here. This memo was originally uncovered by historian Robert Stinnett (1924-2018) and published in his 1999 work, “Day of Deceit.” Here’s the key section:

On October 10, 1940, Roosevelt brought in his Pacific commanders and informed them that he sought to go to war with Japan quietly and with economics. This left them ‘amazed’ according to later testimony by Admiral James O. Richardson.

In the winter of 1940, an American doctor who spent decades in Korea ends up in Hawaii. While there, Koreans keep identifying Japanese military spies on the island. The doctor relates this to the military, who tells him that they know all about it already and not to worry.

On January 27th, the State Department’s Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew learns that the Japanese plan, in case of a conflict with the United States, is to launch a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

Lt. Cmdr. McCollum dictates a memo to the CINC Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 that in case of a Japanese sneak attack, it will most likely happen at Pearl Harbor. Here’s the memo:

Adm. Richardson had been replaced in February 1941 because he was concerned that the Japanese would start a war by attacking the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He was opposed to rehoming the fleet from the West Coast of America in San Diego to Pearl Harbor. He was replaced with Adm. Kimmel.

In May 1941, Japanese diplomats are caught telling the Brazilians that they will be at war with the Americans soon.

Gen. Short replaced Maj. General Albert M. Jones in June 1941, as responsible for the ground defense of the islands.

In late July the press is complaining that FDR has been subsidizing the Japanese war effort because Roosevelt is selling cheap oil and cheap steel to Japan. Roosevelt says he is doing this because if he were to cut these exports off, it would cause war with Japan. A week later, Roosevelt cuts off oil and steel to Japan.

On July 31st, Washington seized 19 Japanese fishing vessels that were spying around Hawaii.

In August Lloyd’s of London started selling “bombing insurance” in Hawaii. A week later, they stopped selling the insurance.

In August, the Konoe government of Japan was begging Washington for a peace treaty. They told Washington they would accept any terms and proposed a peace summit in Hawaii.

Roosevelt demurred and deflected, and the response was that Japan would have to first make humiliating concessions to Washington first.

These actions ultimately caused the collapse of the Japanese government on October 16th and empowered the militarists.

In October, Washington ordered all commercial traffic in the Pacific sea lanes to stop. By clearing the sea lanes, there was a clear path for the Japanese fleet to get to Pearl Harbor. They made it so that no commercial craft would inadvertently alert Pearl Harbor to the incoming attack.

But some did anyway, as reported by the Chicago Tribune:

In mid-October, a Hearst reporter is repeatedly urging Admiral Glassford, the head of the Asiatic Fleet, that the Japanese will attack on or after December 6th. Adm. Glassford takes this seriously enough to personally relocate himself and the reporter to Manila.

On November 3rd, the State Department learns and discusses that the Japanese in Panama have told their allies and representatives that war with America is coming soon and inevitable. See below.

On November 6th, a military engineer named James E. Cassidy was instructed to have plans ready in one hour to build and deploy anti-aircraft regiments and batteries defending the northern island of Oahu, which is precisely the path that the Japanese attack happened from.

These plans were then given a 5-month build-time. Cassidy had no doubt that orders were given to warn of an incoming attack and were countermanded by higher-ups. He said as much in a confidential letter to the U.S. Senator investigating Pearl Harbor in 1945, here’s the excerpt of the letter:

On November 10th, the State Department is gloating that the embargo has brought Japan to its knees, and it will either have to pursue war or humiliating concessions from Washington. They estimate Japan has 10 months of oil for domestic consumption left, and 2 years worth of oil for their Navy stockpiled.

On November 17th, the State Department said in private memos between the Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew and the Secretary of State Cordell Hull that if war with Japan were to start, it would start with a sneak attack. See below.

On November 24, 1941 and again on December 2nd, the military brass knew that the Japanese fleet was outbound and was going to attack somewhere. They discussed over memos whether it would be a British or American possession and base that was attacked.

On November 27th, Washington ordered Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short to set condition 1 across Hawaii, which was putting the entire area on alert for possible acts of sabotage with no threat from attack. Gen. Short was refused permission to distribute ammunition in order to defend the island.

On November 29, 1941, Australia offers to intervene to stop the impending war. They asked to mediate the fight to avoid a war. The response from the State Department and the Secretary of State Cordell Hull was that “the diplomatic stage was over…”

On November 30, 1941, national editorialist Walter Lippmann was explaining that if negotiations with Japan fail, the U.S. will not start a war, but Japan very likely will do so, “…but Japan may start a war in which we shall have to fight back.”

On November 30, 1941, the Honolulu Star-Advertiser announced in a screaming page one headline: the Japanese may strike over the weekend!

The week prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the military was drafting an order declaring martial law.

The carriers had been sent away. The U.S.S. Lexington was sent on November 28th on a training exercise to the southeast. The U.S.S. Enterprise was sent on December 5th west on a patrol mission. The U.S.S. Saratoga had been sent on November 28th to a mission in the South Pacific. The aged and obsolete battleships were left in port, with their port holes open.

The entire Pacific Fleet was brought into the harbor and lined up for a parade and review. Whereas previously the fleet was never gathered in one spot at one time like this, it was gathered on December 6th and prepared so that on Monday December 8th, it could be reviewed by Admiral Husband Kimmel. Kimmel gave leave to the sailors for December 7th, so many of them were hung over on that Sunday morning. According to several tipsters, Admiral Kimmel was as well.

A week prior the newspaper had warned of a possible impending Japanese attack.

Sailors later told their hometown newspapers that a state of war had existed for some time with Japan, and that it was well-known in the Pacific that the Japanese were firing upon U.S. ships. You can read one account of that here in 1942, from Pennsylvania sailor Joseph Purta:

On Dec. 2nd, the State Department was aware that the Japanese were trying to flee American-controlled Panama for Chile because “war was almost inevitable” between America and Japan.

From Dec. 2nd through Dec. 6th, Naval Intelligence officer Robert D. Ogg (1918-2006) was relaying movements of the Japanese fleet, the Kido Butai fleet that would attack Pearl Harbor, to his commander, Capt. Richard T. McCullough. McCullough was in touch with the Roosevelt White House giving them updates on where the Japanese fleet was at.

Prior to the attack, doctors and nurses were warned that an attack was coming, so they stockpiled supplies. On the day of the attack, according to witnesses writing to Senators years later, they noticed that no military reconnaissance planes were in the air anywhere on the island, which was not normal. They were told not to fire a shot without clearance from Washington.

On December 6th the Navy ordered the submarine nets protecting Pearl Harbor taken down for ‘regular maintenance.’

On December 6th, Adm. Johan Ranneft (1886-1982) from the Dutch Navy serving as the attache in Washington is visiting friends in the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C. and while there, he sees an incoming Japanese fleet steaming for Pearl Harbor.

He asks what’s going on and is told to forget what he’s seeing. He had previously seen the same force heading east on December 2nd. When he relates this story years later, he’s called a liar.

But years prior, he had submitted his diaries from those years to an archive. When the archive is checked, his diary noted that he had seen the incoming Japanese fleet on December 6th while at the Navy’s headquarters for military intelligence.

In the evening of December 6th, the men of the U.S.S. Wright see an aircraft carrier steaming towards Pearl Harbor. They cannot determine its nationality, and there is some dispute about whether or not they radio’ed the contact in.

G-2 Military Intelligence ordered the Opana Point radar operators, Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott, to turn off their radar at 7:00AM. Hawaii air defense radar had been on a 24/7 cycle, but were shifted by Washington into a cycle only covering the early mornings.

They disobeyed orders and kept the radar on anyway, to get extra practice time using the machines. When they turned them on at 7:02AM they were alarmed by the incoming fleet of planes, so they reported it immediately.

They were told “not to worry about it.” Repeatedly. No fighters would be sent to intercept the large incoming swarm of planes even with an hour’s warning before the attack started.

This person who refused to take their warnings, Lt. Kermit Tyler (1913-2010), was never reprimanded for his role in negligently allowing the Pearl Harbor attack to happen.

If Lt. Tyler had sent up the fighters to intercept the first Japanese wave when they were first detected at 7:02AM, it’s very likely the U.S.S. Arizona and the U.S.S. Oklahoma would not have been sunk over an hour later. Whenever this is brought up, the court historians claim without evidence that it wouldn’t have mattered.

The Soviet Ambassador had caught the last plane out of Hawaii on Saturday night.

On December 7th, Washington had notice of the break in Japanese relations at noon eastern standard time, which was 6:30AM Hawaii-time. This was 90 minutes before the attack. Hawaii was not notified because of what they said were “technical difficulties” that included a malfunctioning communications device. The message was sent after the attack was over.

There is this meme that the U.S. was just absolutely surprised and shocked that the Japanese chose war.

It came as no surprise to anyone in power at the time.

Here’s a Virginian paper the day before December 7, 1941:

Roosevelt knew. And he could have done anything to stop it. But he didn’t want to stop it. He wanted to use it.