Assad Falls: Why the Syrian Army Collapsed So Quickly

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Key Points: The Syrian army has collapsed, echoing the dramatic falls of the Afghan and South Vietnamese armies. Years of reliance on proxy forces, corruption, and mismanagement under Assad left the military ill-prepared.

-Contributing factors include poor training, lack of small-unit leadership, conscription crises, and neglect of reconstitution during years of foreign-backed dominance.

-As Russia and Iran pulled back support due to geopolitical pressures, rebel forces like HTS swiftly overtook Syrian government-held areas.

-Economic despair and Assad’s focus on normalization and the captagon drug trade further eroded the military’s resolve, culminating in a catastrophic rout that signals the regime’s waning control.

The Collapse of the Syrian Army: A Modern-Day Military Disaster

The Syrian army has rapidly collapsed in a way not seen since the fall of the Afghan and South Vietnamese armies. Initially holding significant leverage at the height of offensives that squeezed rebel and Islamist groups, the Baathist army is now decimated, disorganized, and on its final heels.

The Syrian army, despite being propped up by various militias and states, would become complacent as the Assad regime focused on a lavish lifestyle on a pedestal of ashes rather than reconstituting a professional fighting force. The downfall of the Syrian military has been ongoing for several years, and various factors contributed to the collapse.

The Collapse of the Syrian Army

On November 27th, rebel groups led by HTS, an Islamist organization whose leadership used to be affiliated with al-Qaeda, led a limited offensive in the Aleppo countryside. Suddenly, the Syrian army collapsed entirely, and the HTS and rebel factions would soon completely capture Aleppo and Syrian government-held areas of Idlib.

Marching South towards Hama, the retreating Syrian army attempted to coordinate a defensive line in the provincial capital as Homs would become untenable. The rebel factions and HTS would take the province in less than 72 hours, and a route began.

The Syrian Democratic Forces expelled the Syrian army from Hasakah and Deir Ezzor provinces. The Druze would expel the army from Suwayda, and the reconciliation rebel factions rose against and expelled the military from the Daraa and Quneitra provinces.

Without Iranian intervention, Russian mercenaries, airpower, and special forces, the Syrian army would have shown how weak and inept its unit structure and central leadership indeed were.

Lack of Training for Army in Syria

The Syrian army historically was never as powerful as other regional armed forces such as Egypt’s, Israel’s, Turkey’s, and Iran’s. 

Going through a turbulent period from Sykes-Picot, French rule, and various military dictatorships, the military became corrupt, and under the Hafez and Bashar al Assad regimes, Alawites were given favoritism to rise through the ranks compared to various other sects.

The Syrian army’s professionalism was enshrined in controversial actions such as mass torture and executions in Syria and abductions and assassinations during the Baathist military’s 30-year occupation of Lebanon.

The lack of professionalism and training is enshrined in the hallmarks of juntas and autocrats in the Middle East. Fearing the ruling elite would be overthrown, the Assad family purposely hindered the growth and training of his own forces to solidify the regime’s five-decade rule.

No Small Unit Leadership

Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are the backbone of Western militaries, particularly in the United States Marine Corps. NCOs can carry out small-unit leadership tasks for operational success. The freedom of lower enlisted to make critical thinking decisions on their own allows for more unit success and leadership opportunities to move up the ranks.

Assad’s Syrian military does not have the professionalism of the NCOs in the West. The lack of critical decision-making abilities allowed the lower ranks—particularly at checkpoints to play a role in significant HTS and rebel advances whose Aleppo offensive was only supposed to be limited but turned into a nationwide route.

Demographic Crisis and Failed Conscription Laws

Under Baathist laws, all males are required to serve in the Syrian military for several years. The policy was unpopular, but the Syrian Civil War exacerbated the situation.

Over 100,000 soldiers would either desert or defect to form the Free Syrian Army, and Assad, willing to use any methods to remain king of the ashes, used carpet bombing tactics to attempt to put the uprising down brutally.

 Barrel bombs and nerve gas were used, and the Russian carpet bombings would exacerbate the largest per capita refugee crisis today.

Close to seven million Syrians remain as refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Europe out of a country of 25,000,000. Assad, despite years of negotiations, did not want to repatriate the refugees, and the latter feared torture coming back to Syria by the Baathists.

Already facing a demographic crisis, forced conscription would soon backfire, especially as the country, majority Sunni, revolted and Assad could no longer keep the Alawite community away from the military. Stretched thin with Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, Hezbollah, and Iran out of the fight, it was inevitable the Syrian army would face a precarious situation.

The Assad Regime Focused More on Proxy Militias and Foreign Actors

Assad’s favorable position from 2016 to the autumn of 2024 was not due to his leadership or power but by the direct intervention of the Russian military that was supplemented by IRGC-proxy militias and Hezbollah from Lebanon.

Backfilling significant losses of the Syrian military, the cover of relentless Russian airstrikes plus experienced Hezbollah and IRGC-proxy militias from Iraq and Afghanistan helped push back rebel forces towards the Idlib enclave. Neglecting the eight-plus years to reconstitute the Syrian army was one of Assad’s biggest mistakes as the geopolitical landscape rapidly changed.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is bogging down its military assets to where Russia cannot sustain overseas operations anymore. With over 700,000 casualties, the Black Sea Fleet withdrawn from Crimea, and a fluctuating economy under sanctions, the Kremlin could not afford to send any substantial support to Assad.

Iran’s shadow war with Israel also backfired on the Mullahs. Hamas and Hezbollah have suffered critical losses, the IDF has liquidated many IRGC officers, and the Israeli Air Force has shown it has air superiority over Iranian air defense.

The Syrian army could not backfill the former Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian positions and checkpoints, therefore allowing HTS, the SDF, rebel groups, and ISIS room to operate and break out freely.

A Disenfranchised Military Makes it Easier for Routes

Alongside a lack of supplemented support, Syria already faced a dire economic crisis. While the Assad family and elite government officials reaped the rewards, the remaining people of the country did not—which fueled dissent and anger.

The Syrian pound rapidly decreased in value, living standards during the frozen years of conflict never improved, and the earthquake in northern Syria and lack of government response only exacerbated resentment.

Focusing on normalization and the captagon drug trade instead of improving social services in Syria only pushed the motivation for the Syrian army to fight away, and the illusion of another Russian and Iranian military intervention kept the army from collapsing—until it did.

The Syrian army, decimated and defeated, represents the last vestige of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal hold over not only Syria but Lebanon and the region that suffered from his refugee crisis and drug trade. Lacking motivation, professional, small-unit decision-making, and Iranian and Russian help, the Baathists suffered a more humiliating defeat and collapse than those seen in Afghanistan and Vietnam.

About the Author: Julian McBride 

Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist born in New York. He is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.” Julian is also a new 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.