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Key Points: The Constellation-class frigates, based on the European FREMM design, were intended to fill the U.S. Navy’s frigate gap after the failures of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the retirement of Oliver Hazard Perry-class ships.

-The frigates promise advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities and a multi-role platform with 32 VLS cells and modern sensors.

-However, adapting the design has led to cost increases ($800M to $1.3B), construction delays, and workforce challenges.

-With the first ship delayed to 2029, concerns about speed, affordability, and scalability persist. The Navy must resolve these issues to realize the Connies’ potential and alleviate fleet strain.

Why the Constellation-Class Frigates Are Facing Troubled Waters

The Constellation-class frigate seemed like a safe bet for a service desperate for a procurement win. Wanting a frigate after the failure of the Littoral Combat Ship and the retirement of the last ships of the Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP) class, the U.S. Navy decided to hedge its bets by going with a proven design, the European Multipurpose Frigate (FREMM) proposed by Fincantieri Marine Group and operated by both France and Italy. The ‘Connies’ were supposed to be an easy win, but unfortunately, the program has strayed into the kind of trouble that seems to follow the U.S. Navy wherever it goes.

Constellation-Class: Twilight of the Frigates

The term “frigate” has a very long history in naval circles. During World War II, the modern frigate emerged as a vessel smaller and slower than a destroyer that could specialize in escort work, especially in an anti-submarine role.

In the Royal Navy, these ships were called “sloops” or “corvettes;” in the USN, they were designated “destroyer escorts.” Over the course of the Cold War this type evolved into ships that could perform multiple missions, including anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense.

Over a hundred Knox and Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP) class frigates provided the backbone of the US Navy, supporting carrier battle groups and also operating independently under dangerous conditions. For example, USS Stark, an OHP class frigate, was struck by an Iraqi Exocet missile in 1987 while conducting escort duties in the Persian Gulf.

Relatively inexpensive and unsophisticated, the last of the OHP frigates left American service in the 2010s.  Since that time the roles performed by frigates have been taken on by the DDG-51, an upgrown destroyer that is closer to a cruiser in size and capability. The Arleigh Burkes can do frigate missions, but fleet is already stretched beyond the breaking point and consequently the Navy’s interest in a smaller ship is unsurprising.

Imager: Fincantieri handout.

Failure of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

In the 2000s, it was hoped that the Littoral Combat Ship could fill the gap left by the classic frigates.  Unfortunately, the failure of the Littoral Combat Ship program paved the way for the Connies. Both Austal and Lockheed Martin submitted their respective versions of the LCS for consideration as the basis for the new frigate, and both were rejected (Lockheed Martin withdrew its proposal during the process).  Instead, the FREMM was selected because of the maturity of the design, relatively low cost, and success in international service.

Of course, the US Navy made some adjustments to the original project. The Constellations will displace some 7200 tons, bigger than most foreign destroyers (and bigger than the FREMM) but considerably smaller than the Arleigh Burkes.  They are designed to reach about 26 knots with a crew of less than 200 officers and men, offering the economy that larger ships lack.

As with previous frigates, the Connies will include multirole capabilities but concentrate on anti-submarine support of task forces. 32 VLS cells will offer the essential offensive and defensive firepower.

Additional weapons include 16 canister-launched Naval Strike Missiles and a 21-cell RIM-116 Rolling Airframe SAM missile system.  Modern sensor suites will provide air, surface, and underwater visibility.

Constellation-class

An artist rendering of the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate FFG(X). The new small surface combatant will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations. The design is based on the FREMM multipurpose frigate. A contract for ten ships was awarded to Marinette Marine Corporation, Wisconsin (USA), on 30 April 2020.

Construction of the Constellation began in Marinette, Wisconsin in 2022, with the keel laying taking place in April 2024. The first ships of the new class were expected to start entering service in 2026, although that has already been pushed back to 2029. Several early ships take the names of the “six frigates” built by the US Navy in the late eighteenth century.  Twenty boats are currently planned, but if the class is successful in both shipbuilding and operations, it is not difficult to imagine the Navy ordering more.

Troubles for the Constellation-Class

But now problems are emerging. Concurrent construction means that the Constellation herself is being built even as she is being designed, a process that invariably produces problems and delays.  Adaptation of the FREMM design for US service increased size and weight. Weight growth that the design has already sustained may reduce the speed of the vessels to below 25 knots (making it difficult for the ships to keep up with carriers and DDG-51s) and may make it more difficult to modify the ships with advanced technology in the future.  Perhaps most importantly, the Marinette shipyard has run into severe problems maintaining its workforce, a situation undoubtedly exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

These problems have already pushed up the price of the ship (from $800 million to $1.3 billion) and pushed back its projected completion date by about 36 months, creating a gap in capabilities exacerbated by the retirement of the Ticonderoga class cruisers.

What is the U.S. Navy Doing?

Selecting an already mature design should have made it easy to avoid catastrophes like the LCS and the Zumwalt class destroyer. Unfortunately, there seems to be something fundamentally broken about how the USN acquires new ships.  There is still time to make this project a success, but the stakeholders within the Navy will need to come to an agreement about what they need to give up in order to build a functional, affordable ship.

With thirty-two VLS cells and a suite of capabilities that can help in a wide variety of situations, the Connies still have plenty of upside. If their careers resemble those of the Cold War frigates, they should be able to take some of the burden off the Arleigh Burkes.

However, the USN needs to work hard to turn this program around.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.