What’s Next for U.S. Interests in the Middle East After Syria’s Collapse?

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“Nature abhors a vacuum.” This adage has been proven again, this time in Syria, where the Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) surprised many recently with a highly effective military operation that toppled the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The group’s success was enabled by several factors, including Ankara’s support, Israel’s devasting campaign against Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), and strikes against the Iranian regime and its proxies in the region, exposing the weakness of the Islamic Republic in the eyes of many in the Middle East. Vladimir Putin’s unjustified aggression against the Ukrainian people, a mistaken policy that has cost Russia dearly in terms of blood and treasure, the Assad regime’s corruption and illegitimacy, and the belief of many in the Middle East, especially the Iranians, that once in office Trump will be much more willing to use force to protect U.S. interests in the Middle East than the outgoing Biden administration, are also important factors. 

The collapse of Assad’s regime is an event that gives cause for celebration. Not only has a dictator who has the blood of innocent Syrians on his hands been removed from power, but his morally corrupt backers in Tehran and Moscow have been dealt a serious blow and both Iran and Russia have been humiliated. This is especially important for Russia because it comes at a time when Putin is trying to convince the incoming Trump administration that he is more powerful and influential than he really is to secure a better outcome in a ceasefire negotiation with Kyiv.  The Syrian opposition’s sudden victory also gives many living under oppressive regimes the hope and inspiration to overthrow their dictators. Tel Aviv should also be pleased that Iran’s ability to resupply the remnants of LH is now greatly diminished if not completely eliminated.   

But while many are celebrating the opposition’s victory, they are also watching Syria closely and with serious concerns that Islamic extremists will exploit the moment of regime change to advance their aspirations. States around Syria are already rushing to further secure their borders given concerns the chaos will spill over.

Lebanon is particularly vulnerable to the potential spread of any Islamic Extremist activity that emerges from chaos in Syria. Two-plus years after Lebanon’s last President, Michel Aoun left office, the Lebanese government remains without a President. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which faced tangible challenges before Hassan Nasrallah made the fatal mistake of dragging Lebanon into Iran’s war with Israel after Oct. 7, 2023, has been tasked with securing Lebanon’s southern border with Israel as part of a recently brokered ceasefire needed to contain the fighting between Israel and LH, a mission it was given after the 2006 War between those parties, and failed to execute. In July 2014, the LAF and other Lebanese Security Forces initially struggled to contain an invasion of Lebanese territory by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Lebanese-Syrian border town of Aarsal, although the Lebanese were eventually successful in containing the ISIS threat. 

While Lebanon faces an external threat from extremists operating in Syria that might emerge in the aftermath of the collapse of the Assad regime, the country also must contend with the fact that since the start of the Syrian Civil War, the small Middle Eastern country has become the home of more Syrian refugees per capita than any other country in the world. And, while many of the Syrians in Lebanon may now wish to return to Syria given the removal of Assad, there is no doubt some will remain. Those who do return to Syria will maintain ties in Lebanon that could be exploited for nefarious purposes in the future. Given Lebanon’s ongoing economic, social, and political problems, nobody can ignore the reality that the country is vulnerable to the spread of extremist ideology and threats.

The outgoing Biden administration failed to develop and pursue an effective Middle East policy over the past four years with two of America’s most important allies, Israel and Türkiye.  Israel has done to Iran and its proxies what Washington was unwilling to do, and Türkiye, unlike the U.S., never turned its back on the Syrian Opposition. Ankara’s commitment to groups like HTS is now paying off.  But how far and how long Ankara’s “reach” will extend in Syria remains a legitimate question given the complicated history and realities of the Levant.

The Trump administration is being handed excellent opportunities to finish the rollback of Iran and Russia in the Levant, enabled by two US allies. To successfully exploit the emerging opportunities, Washington will need to take decisive steps almost as soon as President Trump enters office.  

First, there is little doubt that President Erdogan will push for Trump to end U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces/Peoples Protection Units (SDF/YPG), aka the Kurdistan People’s Party (PKK) in the eyes of most Turks. President Trump almost took this step during his first term in office. Ankara will argue that when President Obama and his team proposed support for the Syrian Kurds, they promised that U.S. support would be “temporary, transactional and tactical.” However, 10 years later, despite the claims of many experts and President Trump’s own claim in 2020 that ISIS had been defeated, Washington continues to pursue a policy in Syria that is a direct threat to Turkish national security. 

Erdogan will further argue that Ankara went along with Washington’s appeals for support for Swedish and Finnish entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and despite the claims of some that Türkiye has not been tough enough on Russia since Moscow’s expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Turks have provided more assistance to Ukraine than most other NATO partners, including before February 2022, and Ankara is a critical NATO partner with the alliance’s second largest standing military and the capacity to play a key role in helping the U.S. counter strategic threats posed by Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran.  

In response to any such appeal from Erdogan, the new administration should strongly consider ending support for the SDF/YPG, but only if Türkiye agrees to several conditions, including a solid commitment to allow the U.S. to work jointly with Ankara to target future extremist threats that may emerge in Syria, including using Turkish territory to launch strikes against these threats; Ankara agrees to U.S. proposals to resolve the S-400 missile issue that has plagued U.S.-Turkish relations since Erdogan decided to purchase this weapon system from Moscow; Ankara accept full responsibility for the actions of its proxies in Syria and understand that if the Turks allow these proxies to commit atrocities against minority populations in Syria, Ankara will be held accountable and face serious consequences from the U.S.; and, Ankara commit to playing an active role in any future peace keeping operations in Ukraine should the Ukrainians find the deployment of Turkish troops to Ukrainian territory acceptable.

In Lebanon, it is not yet clear whether Lebanese AMAL party leader and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri will push ahead with presidential elections on 9 January 2025 or listen to appeals from Trump’s newly appointed Middle East Advisor Massad Boulos for Beirut to wait until Trump takes office to proceed with elections. 

If the Lebanese elect a president, the new administration will need to work quickly to establish credibility and influence with the new Lebanese leadership and both empower and insist that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) secure the Lebanese-Israeli border and stop Israel’s enemies from using this region to attack Northern Israel. If elections are delayed until after President Trump’s inauguration, the administration will need to move quickly to enable Beirut to elect a president and, again, insist that the new Lebanese government fulfills its commitments to secure the Southern Border, while also protecting Lebanon from any negative fallout from Syria. The administration will also have to work with key allies to provide much-needed aid and reconstruction assistance to Lebanon and should use this opportunity to push for the complete disarmament of LH and the end of Iranian exploitation of Lebanon as Iran’s puppet. It will have to remember that past hesitation and lack of commitment by the U.S. to war-torn countries like Lebanon allowed Iran to fill the void with its extremist proxy LH and secure a foothold in the Levant that was a threat to America and its most important ally.

President Trump should also highlight Assad’s demise to Putin, reminding the Russian “strongman” that Assad’s refusal to accept a compromise with Washington and Ankara that would have reduced Assad’s diplomatic isolation and pressure on the Syrian economy appears to have angered those around Assad, who in turn, were in no rush to come to his aid when the opposition started moving on Damascus. Thus, when Trump offers Putin an opportunity to end fighting in Ukraine, Putin would be wise to listen carefully and accept the need to make serious compromises or face the same response from “loyalists” who are also likely tired of living with the negative impacts of his poor decision making. 

How Washington plays its cards in the Levant in the coming months will prove critical for U.S. national security. Unfortunately, past U.S. administrations have failed to demonstrate decisive and courageous leadership when dealing with previous opportunities that presented themselves, but if the Trump administration is ready to move out quickly and work with its key allies in the region, President Trump can end his second term knowing that America’s prestige and influence in the Middle East were greatly improved under his watch.